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LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
WILLIAM E. NELSON
A decade ago I contributed to the Annual Survey of American Law
my first review of the literature in the field of American legal his-
tory.' This year I would like to look back over the past ten with the
hope of identifying at least some of the continuities and changes in the
literature during that period.
Continuities in the Literature.-Many legal historians continue to
concentrate on discussions of factual data in their writings about the
American legal past. Some legal historians, such as Robert Mennel in
Thorns and Thistles: Juvenile Delinquents in the United States, 1825-
1940,2 have enlarged our factual knowledge on a variety of narrow
topics.3 Others are still writing books and articles which do little other
than cover familiar factual ground.4 Such works include Alan Reitman's
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1. See Nelson, Constitutional History, 1966 Ann. Survy Am. L. 687.
2. R. Mennel, Thorns and Thistles: Juvenile Delinquents in the United States,
1825-1940 (1973).
3. See Clark, The Elephant Butte Controvers): A Chapter in the Emergence of
Federal Water Law, 61 J. Am. Hist. 1006 (1975); Colburn, Governor Alfred E. Smith
and the Red Scare, 1919-20, 88 Pol. Sci. Q. 423 (1973); Holdsworth, Adultery or
Witchcraft? A New Note on an Old Case in Connecticut, 48 N. Eng. Q. 394 (1975);
Johnson, The Business of War: Trading with the Enemy in English and Early
American Law, 118 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc'y 459 (1974); Langum, Pioneer Justice on
the Overland Trails, 5 Western Hist. Q. 421 (1974); Mackey, An Alt-Star Debate oi
Capital Punishment, Boston, 1854, 110 Essex ItSL Hist. Coll. 181 (1974); Planck,
Lincoln's Assassination: More Forgotten Litigation--Ex parte Mudd (1868), 75 Lincoln
Herald 86 (1974); Prude, Portrait of a Civil Libertarian: The Faith and Fear of
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 60 J. Am. Hist. 633 (1973); Stanton. The Presidency and the
Purse: Impoundment, 1803-1973, 45 Colo. L. Rev. 25 (1973); Taylor. The Foreign
Attachment Law and the Coming of the Revolution in North Carolina, 52 N.C.
Hist. Rev. 20 (1975).
4. See H. Abraham, Justices and Presidents: A Political History of Appointments
to the Supreme Court (1974); G. Dargo, Roots of the Republic: A New Perspective on
Early American Constitutionalism (1974); Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: The
Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. Am. Hist. 65 (1974); Buchanan.
The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Houston
L. Rev. 1, 331, 592, 843, 1069 (1974-75); Campbell, Chancellor Kent, Chief Justice
Marshall and the Steamboat Cases, 25 Syracuse L. Rev. 497 (1974); Crawford, A
Footnote on Courts for Trial of Negroes in Colonial Pennsylvania. 5 J. Black Stud.
167 (1974); Duram, The Labor Union Journals and the Constitutional Issues of the
New Deal: The Case for Court Restriction, 15 Labor HiSt. 216 (1974); Ehrlich, The
Origins of the Dred Scott Case, 59 J. Negro Hist. 132 (1974); Flanigan. Criminal
Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South, 40 J. So. Hist. 537 (1974); Gib-
bons, The Interdependence of Legitimacy: An Introduction to the Mcaning of
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book, The Pulse of Freedom: American Liberties, 1920-1970's,5 which
deals with the struggle for civil liberties in the United States during the
past fifty years; Walter Trattner's, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A
History of Social Welfare in America, which discusses the history of the
nation's social welfare system over the past three centuries; and, Milton
Read's article on land tenure in colonial Georgia 7 which retells how
the efforts of Georgia's trustees "to eliminate economic privilege within
their model community in America" 8 resulted in their restricting the
size of farms and the tenure by which they were held.
Other essentially factual writing makes a more substantial con-
tribution. In this regard, a valuable contribution is the third volume of
North Carolina Higher-Court Records, 1702-1708,9 part of a series of
the records of the General Court of basic common law jurisdiction, the
Chancery Court, and the Admiralty Court of North Carolina. The single
most important factual contribution has probably been made by Harold
Hyman in A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil Var and
Reconstruction on the Constitution.o Hyman's erudition is immense;
moreover, he conceives of constitutional history as including not only
lawyers' law but political theory and administrative development as well.
Adrian Cook's detailed study, The Armies of the Streets: The New York
City Draft Riots of 1863, 1 is of special note for its two chapters describ-
ing the dreadful conditions of life among the poor of mid-nineteenth
century New York.
Five other factually oriented books are also particularly important:
Peter Fish's The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration,2 which
Separation of Powers, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 435 (1974); Grossman, Wage and Price
Controls During the American Revolution, 96 Monthly Labor Rev., Sept. 1973, at 3;
Leuchtenburg, A Klansman Joins the Court: The Appointment of Hugo L. Black, 41
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1973); Morgan, Eastman, Gale & Areen, Impeachment: An His-
torical Overview, 5 Seton Hall L. Rcv. 689 (1974); Novak, The College in the Dart-
mouth College Case: A Reinterpretation, 47 N. Eng. Q. 550 (1974); Oberst, The
Strange Career of Plessy v. Ferguson, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 389 (1973); Risjord, Virginians
and the Constitution: A Multivariant Analysis, 31 Win. & Mary Q. 613 (3d ser. 1974):
Roe & Osgood, United States Supreme Court, February Term 1824, 81 Yale L.J. 770
(1975); Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure anl
Emasculation, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 419 (1973); Van Alstync, A Critical Gude to Ex parte
McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229 (1973).
5. The Pulse of Freedom: American Liberties, 1920-1970's (A. Reitman ed. 1975).
6. W. Trattmer, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in
America (1974).
7. Read, Land Tenure in Trusteeship Georgia, 48 Agric. Hist. 353 (1974).
8. Id.
9. North Carolina Higher Court Records, 1702-1708 (IV. Price cd. 1974).
10. H. Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Re-
construction on the Constitution (1973).
11. A. Cook, The Armies of the Streets: The New York City Draft Riots of 1863
(1974).
12. P. Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration (1973).
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studies the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Administrative
Office of the Courts, the Federal Judicial Center, and various adminis-
trative agencies at the circuit level; William H. Harbaugh's Lawyer's
Lawyer: The Life of John 1V. Davis,13 which is a thoroughly detailed
study of the life, personality, and career of Davis; Robert M. Ireland's
The County Courts in Antebellum Kentucky,' 4 which contains a wealth
of new information about the structure and functioning of the Kentucky
county courts; R. Alton Lee's A History of Regulatoiy Taxation,t 5
which is a detailed discussion of various federal taxes enacted during the
last century for purposes of regulation; and William Twining's Karl
Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,10 which includes an introduc-
tory section of some seventy pages on the background of the realist inove-
ment.
David M. Billikopf, with his The Exercise Of Judicial Power, 1789-
1864,17 makes a substantial contribution to early nineteenth century
constitutional history by placing largely unknown antebellum circuit
and district court decisions in juxtaposition with some more widely
known Supreme Court cases. George Fiedler in his general study, The
Illinois Law Courts in Three Centuries, 1673-1973: A Documentary His-
tory,'s presents new information on the French judicial system that
existed during the first century of Illinois's history. He also discusses
the jurisdictional confusion that existed between 1764, when the British
assumed control of Illinois from the French, and 1790, when the
mechanisms of American territorial government finally reached Illinois.
Three articles are also of interest in expanding our available factual
information. One, by Robert Seddig, locates the origins of the Supreme
Court's unique role in American government in the practice developed
by Chief Justice Ellsworth of disposing of cases by unanimous rather
than seriatim opinions, in the special political skills of Chief Justice
Marshall, and in the need of the Federalist Court to present a united
front to the Jefferson administration during the years 1801-180-1.1 9 An
article by Albert Cowdrey2 0 describes how Section 13 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899, which has recently become a mainstay in the
federal statutory scheme of environmental protection, originated as
13. AV. Harbaugh, Lawyer's Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis (1973).
14. R. Ireland, The County Courts in Antebellum Kentucky (1972).
15. R. A. Lee, A History of Regulatory Taxation (1973).
16. W. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (1973).
17. D. Billikopf, The Exercise of Judicial Power, 1789-1804 (1973).
18. G. Fiedler, The Illinois Law Courts in Three Centuries, 1673-1973: A
Documentary History (1973).
19. Seddig, John Marshall and the Origins of Supreme Court Leadership, 36 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 785 (1975).
20. Cowdrey, Pioneering Environmental Law: The Army Corps of Engineers and
the Refuse Act, 44 Pac. HiSt. Rev. 331 (1975).
Imaged with the Pemission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
HeinOnline  -- 1976 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 429 1976
1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
legislation that gave the government power to prevent the obstruction
of navigation without having to prove that any particular discharge
had, in fact, obstructed a waterway. Steven Schlossman discusses the
New York House of Refuge,2 1 an institution established in 1825 as both
a prison and a school, a place to "punish as well as to teach.'"
22
The single most interesting factual claim was made by Harold
Chesnin and Geoffrey Hazard concerning the practice of English
Chancery courts in the eighteenth century.2 3 Chesnin and Hazard re-
ported that issues of fact were ordinarily referred to juries sitting at law
whenever there was a substantial conflict in the evidence; they claim
that it was only during the nineteenth century that "referral to a jury
... [became] wholly discretionary and the jury verdict merely advisory."
2 4
This claim has been challenged, however, by John Langbein.25
Langbein concedes that in most cases the Chancellor did refer disputed
questions of fact to juries, but contends that the Chancellor had a
residual power to decide such questions by himself. It is somewhat
difficult to resolve the issue drawn between Langbein, on one hand,
and Chesnin and Hazard, on the other, on the basis of the evidence
they present. In the few cases that Langbein cites in which the
Chancellor did seem to find facts, such findings have a greater resem-
blance to the granting of summary judgment on a clear written record
than to the weighing of credibility and probability of oral testimony in
a closely balanced case. More research is needed-research in which
American legal historians should be eager to participate. If the Chesnin-
Hazard position should turn out to be correct, their position could ex-
plain why the crown's program of conferring fact-finding powers on
colonial equity judges, powers the Chancellor himself did not possess,
seemed to be an unusually "aggressive measure" 20 to the colonials and
would explain the vigorous opposition in the colonies to the equity
courts.
The area in which the largest number of important factual con.
tributions was made is that of black legal history. In her new book,
Black Resistance/White Law,2 7 Mary Berry details innumerable instances
of the use of federal power, often in a quite bloody manner, to repress
21. See Schliossman, Juvenile Justice in the Age of Jackson, 76 Teach. Col. Rec.
119 (1974).
22. Id. at 133.
23. See Chesnin & Hazard, Chancery Procedure and the Seventh Amendment:
Jury Trial of Issues in Equity Cases Before 1791, 83 Yale L.J. 999 (1974).
24. Id. at 1011.
25. See Langbein, Fact Finding in the English Court of Chancery: A Rebuttal, 83
Yale L.J. 1620 (1974).
26. See Chesnin & Hazard, supra note 23, at 1019.
27. M. Berry, Black Resistance/White Law (1971).
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blacks. Three valuable articles spell out the important role that blacks
played in late nineteenth century efforts to secure racial equality. First,
John Hope Franklin writes of the efforts of blacks to secure enforce-
ment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875-efforts which failed because of
doubts about the Act's constitutionality and the lukewarm attitude of
federal enforcement officials. 2 6 The successful efforts of a black state
legislator in Ohio, in conjunction with white proponents of equality, to
obtain passage of an anti-lynching law in the mid 1890's were examined
by David Gerber in a 1974 article.2 9 Finally, Dale Somers explores the
development of new equalitarian racial attitudes in New Orleans as a
result of effective black leadership supported by black voters and the
use of federal power during the two decades after the Civil War.30 He
notes that, although racial discrimination did persist during the period
of 1865-1900, flexible racial practices arose based on day-to-day needs
and demands of ordinary citizens. For at least two dlecades after the
war, "residents from the rank and file of both races plaed and worked
together on amicable, harmonious, even equalitarian terims.' 31 Toward
the end of the century, these individual practices were reversed by
legislation as whites demanded and imposed racial segregation.
Another article, discussing the controversy in Kentucky between
state and federal authorities concerning whether testimony of blacks
should be admissible in trials, shows that even in border states federal
officials worked hard for black equality.32 According to its author,
Victor Howard, "by January, 1869, the docket of the federal court had
become largely a calender of cases tried under state law by the federal
court due to the denial of equality of testimony in state courts. Besides
the large number of cases that were taken directly before the federal
court, many were transferred before trial and others on appeal from
state courts."3
3
Despite these efforts, however, the post-Civil War drive for racial
equality failed and blacks were subjected to a new system of involuntary
servitude.3 4 According to William Cohen,
28. See Franklin, The Enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 6 Prologue
225 (1974).
29. See Gerber, Lynching and Law and Order: Origin and Passage of the Ohio
Anti-Lynching Law of 1896, 83 Ohio Hist. 33 (1974).
30. See Somers, Black and White in New Orleans: A Study in Urban Race Rela-
tions, 1865-1900, 40 J. So. Hist. 19, 35-38 (1974).
31. Id. at 30.
32. See Howard, The Black Testimony Controversy in Kentucky, 1866-1872, 58 J.
Negro Hist. 140 (1973).
33. Id. at 157.
34. See Cohen, Negro Involuntary Sernitude in the South, 1865-19-10: A Pre-
liminary Analysis, 42 J. So. HiSt. 31 (1976).
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Far less rigid than slavery, the system of involuntary servitude
that emerged after the Civil War was a fluid, flexible affair which
alternated between free and forced labor in time to the rhythm of
the southern labor market. Employers had the legal and social tools
to compel labor from blacks, but the use of such measures was not
obligatory. When labor was plentiful, Draconian powers were un-
needed. When it was scarce, they were readily at hand. Thus, whites
had no reason to impede black mobility except when faced with a
real or anticipated shortage of hands, and the system had something
of a "now you see it, now you don't" quality about it. Still, com-
pulsion was frequent enough. Even when unused, force posed an
omnipresent threat which had a pervasive effect upon the tone of
the southern labor system.
35
While several of these factually oriented articles are important,
none of them is different in kind from the sort of literature that was
being published a decade ago. The book which perhaps best illustrates
the similarity of recent factually oriented writing to earlier writing is
Carl B. Swisher's The Taney Period, 1836-64.36 This volume, like tie
two earlier volumes in the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 37 is encyclopedic in its research and
in its coverage of topics, but, unfortunately, does little to illuminate the
significance of the past. Swisher's The Taney Period, 1836-64, in short,
is a book that is vital as a reference source for anyone who needs in-
formation about the mid-nineteenth century Supreme Court; like most
of the writing of a decade ago, it is not a book that one would examine
for its ideas.
Also similar to the literature of ten years ago are most of the
articles surveying such matters as the methodology of legal history,88
available source materials, 3 9 or the existing literature. 40 One such
article, which summarizes the legal source materials that have been
microfilmed by the Mormon Genealogical Society, is quite important
35. Id. at 33.
36. C. Swisher, The Taney Period, 1836-64 (1974).
37. See C. Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88, Part One (1971): J.
Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (1971).
38. See, e.g., Parker, Thc Masochism of the Legal Historian, 24 U. Toronto L.J.
279 (1974); Zobel, The Joys and Uses of Legal History, 84 Mass. Hist. Soc'y Proc. 53
(1972).
39. See, e.g., Main, Probate Records As a Source for Early American History, 32
Win. & Mary Q. 89 (3d ser. 1975); Smith, Underregistration and Bias in Probate
Records: An Analysis of Data from Eighteenth-Century Hingham, Massachusetts, 32
Win. & Mary Q. 100 (3d ser. 1975).
40. See Holt, Now and Then: The Uncertain State of Nineteenth.Century
American Legal History, 7 Ind. L. Rev. 615 (1974); Winitsky, Roger B. Taney: A
Historiographical Inquiry, 69 Md. Hist. Mag. 1 (1974).
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since it indicates how historians may obtain access to the film and even
gives the hours during which various Mormon libraries are open and
the means by which film may be purchased.4 ' While articles of this sort
offer promise for the future development of the field of legal history,
they are not in themselves indications that important developments have
already begun to occur.
Professionalization of Legal Histoy.-In fact, significant changes
have begun to occur in the field of American legal history as a result of
increasing professionalization. Professionalization is most visible, per-
haps, in the pages of the American Journal of Legal History, in which
many articles ten years ago were addressed not to academic legal his-
torians but to practicing attorneys. In the last two years, however, the
Journal has become a publication in which academic historians speak
to each other. Since virtually every one of the many articles in the
Journal has become essential reading for those wishing to keep current
in the field, I have not included them in this review. The professionaliza-
tion of the Journal has not been a unique development, but has been
paralleled by the creation of a legal history series by the Harvard
University Press-a series which has published two monographs in the
past two years.42 The appearance of a professionally oriented body of
literature is a central element in the emergence of any genuine pro-
fession.
43
Signs of professionalization can also be seen in the methodological
literature of the past two years. Several methodological articles make
a point, not generally accepted when I made it in these pages ten years
ago, 44 that we cannot resolhe current legal questions by asking how the
past intended us to resolve them when the past never asked the ques-
tion which concerns us and therefore left no answer.4 William Wiecek
recognizes the power of this truism in his book The Guarantee Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.46 Wiecek devotes relatively few pages to an
analysis of the intentions of the Constitution's framers, but instead
concentrates on how the Guarantee Clause has evolved over time.
41. Gerlach & Nicholls, The Mormon Genealogical Society and Research Op-
portunities in Early American History, 32 Win. & Mary Q. 625 (3d ser. 1975).
42. See G. Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal Tradi-
tions (1975); IV. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Lawv: The Impact of Legal
Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (1975).
43. See T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 19-21 (2d ed. 1970).
44. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 695.
45. See Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 5 Conn. L. Rev. 368 (1972-73); Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of
the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, with Special Emphasis Upon the Doctrine
of Separation of Powers, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 583 (1973).
46. W. WViecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution (1972).
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Those articles which do seek to examine "the original intent"' T -
and they are far fewer in number than they were a decade ago-do so
with considerable sensitivity and with an explicit recognition of the
limits of their analysis. Charles Wolfram, for example, in an excellent
article on "The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment," 48
recognizes that we cannot answer with certainty whether the framers
intended juries always to be unanimous bodies of twelve men, but
argues that we can be quite certain that "[j]uries were sought to be
thrust into cases to effect a result different from that likely to be ob-
tained by an honest judge sitting without a jury."40 Similarly Charles
Lofgren, while recognizing that "the original understanding"0 0 cannot
always bind the present, maintains that the founding fathers expected
that compulsory military service would be required only in the militia
and purposely provided the federal government with sufficient means of
raising revenue so that it could recruit the regular army voluntarily and
thereby avoid conscription. Finally, Arthur Bestor quite rightly con-
cludes that the Constitution's framers did not believe in a rigid ap-
plication of the doctrine of separation of powers, but instead intended
to have the branches of government checking and balancing each other
by participating in various governmental functions.51 What is implicit
even in the articles that do search for original intent is an assumption
that the past was not the same as the present, that people in the past
did not see issues in the same light as we do in the present, and hence
that the past can never yield precise, binding answers to the problems
of the present.
This assumption about the essential difference between the past
and the present is, of course, axiomatic for practicing historians, who
generally seek not to instruct us about the answers to present problems
but to explain the processes of historical evolution and the reasons for
particular historical changes. Legal historians have begun to do the
same. In Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal Tradi-
tions,52 George Dargo traces the evolution of American law and govern.
ment in Louisiana during the first decade of the nineteenth century.
Dargo explains that the American takeover of Louisiana in 1803 led to
a conscious attempt to impose American culture and law on the area in
47. Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Original
Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 527 (1974).
48. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 Minn.
L. Rev. 639 (1973).
49. Id. at 653.
50. Lofgren, Compulsory Military Service under the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 33 Win. & Mary Q. 61 (3d ser. 1976).
51. See Bestor, supra note 47.
52. See G. Dargo, supra note 42.
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order to replace the indigenous Franco-Spanish system. -When many
American newcomers in Louisiana sympathized with the Burr Con-
spiracy in 1805-07, however, the territorial administration forged an
alliance with the old French settlers; Louisiana's adherence to the civil
law is a product of that alliance.
In another book, Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the
North, 1780-1861,53 Thomas Morris brilliantly traces the gradual polar-
ization of ideological positions in the mid-nineteenth century on the
issue of fugitive slaves, with the result that room for compromise between
North and South became increasingly limited. In his study of sexual
morality and social control, David Pivar argues that a basic transforma-
tion in American attitudes toward power occurred between the late
eighteenth and late nineteenth century. 4 He notes that the framers of
American constitutions in the late eighteenth century harbored a healthy
fear of all governmental power and sought to restrain its use. By the
end of the nineteenth century, however, Americans were willing to use
power as long as it was directed to the attainment of legitimate social
goals. His argument suggests that restraints were imposed on govern-
mental economic intervention in the late 19th century not because of
any fear of governmental power in general, but because of a fear that
power would be used for illegitimate ends, such as taking property from
one individual and giving it to another. When government could in-
tervene in the economy without redistributing wealth, however, its in-
tervention was tolerated.
There are also some noteworthy articles which seek to explain im-
portant historical changes. One, which traces Indian-white legal relations
in seventeenth century Plymouth, notes that in the 1620's Indians were
treated fairly and punished equally to whites even though ethnocentric
English attitudes required that English courts resolve disputes between
English settlers and Indians.55 After King Philip's War, however, many
Indians were enslaved and "considerations of protection for Indian
rights were ignored." 56 In another article, one of the best of the last
two years, Lance Banning asks the important question why the federal
constitution, to which so much opposition existed in 1787-1789, gained
such quick acceptance that by the early 1790's opposition had largely
53. T. Morris, Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the North, 1780-1861
(1974).
54. D. Pivar, Purity Crusade: Sexual Morality and Social Control, 1868-1900
(1973).
55. Ronda, Red and White at the Bench: Indians and the Law in Plymouth
Colony, 1620-1691, 110 Essex Inst. Hist. Coll. 200 (1974).
56. Id- at 213.
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disappeared 7 Banning's answer rests upon his claim that a main ele-
ment of eighteenth century thought was the fear of constitutional
degeneration-a fear which resulted in an instinctive unwillingness to
alter constitutional provisions once they had been written. Among the
signs of corruption and degeneration to which the eighteenth century
was attuned were an ambitious executive, a standing army, rising taxes,
public debts, and chartered corporations. Republicans saw in Hamil-
ton's program, which contained all these measures together with the
broad construction and the social elitism of Hamiltonian Federalists,
the beginnings of constitutional subversion:
But opposition to the progress of social and political corruption
traditionally required an ancient constitution against which it could
measure the degeneration of the present day. A critique of con-
stitutional corruption needed an accepted constitution that coutld
be seen to undergo a process of decay .... Paradoxically, then, it
was the appearance of a deeply felt opposition to the policies of our
first administration which assured the quick acceptance of the
Constitution .... 5s
Another sign of increasing professionalization among legal his-
torians is the recognition by recent writers of one of the special powers
of historical analysis-the capacity of a good historian to place two
seemingly discrete events in juxtaposition and thereby understand both
events more fully. Few legal historians engaged in this process of juxta-
position a decade ago, but many have in the past two years. Robert
Stevens, for example, has urged that legal developments in the United
States can often be better understood if they are viewed in juxtaposition
with developments in England.5 9 In particular, he notes that anti-lawyer
sentiment in early Massachusetts was little different from anti-lawyer
sentiment in Civil War England and that changes in post-Civil War
England and changes in post-Revolutionary American law were part of
a broader late eighteenth and early nineteenth century process of
modernization of the common law. George Haskins,00 agreeing with
Stevens, has argued that Massachusetts did not become a Bible Common.
wealth because
57. Banning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to
1793, 31 Won. & Mary Q. 167 (3d ser. 1974).
58. Id. at 187.
59. See Stevens, Unexplored Avenues in Comparative Anglo-American Legal -ils-
tory, 48 Tulane L. Rev. 1086 (1974).
60. See Haskins, Representative Government and the "Bible Commonwealth" in
Early Massachusetts, 9 Akron L. Rev. 207 (1975).
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[the settlers] remained, in their respective circumstances and back-
grounds, Englishmen of their time. They brought with them out-
looks and social attitudes which not only reflected contemporary
England but much of the legacy and humanism of the Renaissance.
Thus, except insofar as their daily life and intellectual tastes were
affected by Puritan principles, and their institutions necessarily
molded by the same driving concerns for which the colonial enter-
prise had been undertaken, they remained basically English in their
outlooks, habits and understanding.61
Employing similar comparative modes of analysis, Scott Powe has
urged that the activist role pursued by the Supreme Court from the
1890's to the 1930's under the rubric of due process can be properly
understood only against the background of the Court's earlier activist
role in some two hundred municipal bond cases decided between 1865
and 1890;62 Russell Wheeler has concluded that the rejection by early
federal judges of the English and colonial model permitting judges to
perform a wide variety of extrajudicial functions can be understood
only in conjunction with the simultaneous development of the ideal of
the rule of law;63 Jonathan Lurie has maintained that nineteenth cen-
tury private commodities exchanges can be usefully analyzed as legal
analogues of twentieth century administrative agencies;," and Milton
Klein has suggested that the role of lawyers in the coming of the
American Revolution was parallel to the role which Arthur Schlesinger,
Sr. thought was played by merchants.0 5
The two items that use the process of juxtaposition to reach the
most interesting conclusions are a book on witchcraft in Salem and an
article on the jurisprudence of Justice Holmes. In Salem Possessed: The
Social Origins of Witchcraft,66 Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum
seek to explain how the terror of witchcraft in Salem occurred. They
relate it to the breakdown of a theocratically oriented society which was
trying to maintain itself against the onslaught of liberal capitalism.
Their position is that the farmers of Salem Village were seeking to main-
61. Id. at 216.
62. Powe, Rehearsal for Substantive Due Process: The Municipal Bond Cases, 53
Texas L. Rev. 738 (1975).
63. Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, [1973] Sup.
Ct. Rev. 123.
64. Lurie, Commodities Exchanges as Self-Regulating Organizations in the Latc
19th Century: Some Perimeters in the History of American Administrative Law, 28
Rutgers L. Rev. 1107 (1975).
65. See Klein, New York Lawyers and the Coming of the American Revolution,
55 N.Y. Hist. 383 (1974).
66. P. Boyer & S. Nissenbaum, Salem Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft
(1974).
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tain a sort of utopian community safe from the pollutions of the material
world-pollutions which, like all other sin, were both evil and attractive.
The farmers reacted to liberal capitalism by viewing it the same way
they viewed other sin, and they punished those committing the sin with
the extreme punishment of death. Only when the sin failed to go away
did the villagers cease their attempt to construct a heaven on earth, turn
to the next world for their solace, and thereby permit a liberal legal
order to emerge in this world.
Likewise, the author of a student note, "Holmes, Peirce and Legal
Pragmatism, ' '6 7 in searching for the source of Holmes's "theory of ex-
ternal legal standards" 68 and his "attack, implicit throughout The
Common Law, on the notion that private, internal standards can serve
as a basis of legal liability,"0 9 turns to the philosophy of Charles Peirce,
a close associate of Holmes in the late 1860's. The note maintains that
"Holmes's recognition that only public standards can function as legal
rules is paralleled in Charles Peirce's attack on the epistemology of
Rene Descartes."7 0 The author continues that "Peirce sought to replace
Descartes's reliance on the 'natural light' of immediate intuition of clear
and distinct ideas with the process of a community of inquirers reaching
agreement through application of public and accepted methods of re-
search." 71 This juxtaposition of Holmes and Peirce is especially im-
portant for what it suggests about a more general inquiry into post-Civil
War historiography-an inquiry into the reasons for the rejection
throughout American society of private moral intuitions as standards
of conduct.72
Legal Histoiy as Philosophy.-As the literature reviewed in the past
several paragraphs suggests, the growing professionalization in the field
of American legal history is extremely valuable for the new insights it
can yield into the nature of our legal past. Yet professionalization can
also have its costs, one of which can be the withdrawal of history and its
practitioners from the needs and concerns of the society in which we live
today. Fortunately, however, at least some legal historians are not with-
drawing into purely academic areas, but are instead directing their
research and writing toward important current questions. These legal
67. Note, Holmes, Peirce and Legal Pragmatism, 84 Yale L.J. 1123 (1975).
68. Id. at 1129.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1130.
71. Id. at 1131.
72. See Nelson, Officeholding and Powerwielding: An Analysis of the Relation.
ship Between Structure and Style in American Administrative History, 10 L. &
Soc'y Rev. 187, 220-31 (1976); Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon
Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 I-arv. L. Rev. 513,
547-66 (1974).
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historians are attempting to write history as a form of political
philosophy.
Two broad groups of philosophically oriented historians can be
identified within the writing of the past two years. The first group
consists of several radical critics of the existing legal order who attempt
to show that the existing structure of legal thought and legal doctrine
has or necessarily must oppress the weak and the poor. Jerold Auerbach,
for example, has written a highly political essay in Alan Reitman's
book, The Pulse of Freedom.7 3 Auerbach's essay, entitled "The Depres-
sion Decade," 74 argues that "the prototypical Depression victim of civil
liberties infractions was an industrial worker, a union organizer, or a
radical critic of capitalism."7 5 This approach, however, is an unduly
narrow one. While labor made an important contribution to civil
liberties in the 1930's, one cannot ignore the contribution of other
groups such as artists and blacks simply because such groups do not
readily fit into a Marxist view of history. Auerbach's political view of
history is, in short, distorted.
Similarly, Mary Berry71o tries to argue that since federal power has
often been used to repress blacks, the Constitution was formulated for
the purpose of repression. She labels American constitutional law as
"a handy philosophical tool for maintaining white superiority,"17 since
it is based on "essentially racist, not legal, concerns."7 8 Unfortunately,
Professor Berry has exaggerated her argument, failing to separate out
historical cause from historical consequence.
Far more sophisticated are the writings of Morton Horwitz and
Joel Brenner. In his outstanding essay, "The Historical Foundations of
Modern Contract Law," 79 Horwitz's main theme is that the modern
"will theory of contract,"8 0 which arose in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century, necessarily favors capitalist entrepreneurs at the
expense of the weak, the unsophisticated and the poor. To the extent
that Horwitz limits his analysis to a discussion of the effects of the will
theory, the position is a plausible one, for our modern experience sug-
gests that the doctrine of freedom of contract does benefit the strong at
the expense of the weak. Unfortunately, he occasionally weakens his
thesis by arguing that contract law was purposely formulated to produce
73. A. Reitman, supra note 5.
74. Auerbach, The Depression Decade, in A. Reitman, supra note 5, at 65.
'75. Id.
76. See M. Berry, supra note 27.
77. Id. at 1.
78. Id. at ix.
79. Honvitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 Harv. L.
Rev. 917 (1974).
80. Id. at 936.
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repressive results. This claim is much less plausible in view of the social
fragmentation or mobility that existed in early nineteenth century
America. That fragmentation and mobility, coupled with contemporary
awareness of those phenomena, would have made it difficult for mem-
bers of the small elite that Horwitz believes to have benefited from a
will theory of contract to have identified each other and conspired to
put that theory into practice. Nonetheless, Horwitz's article, which is part
of a forthcoming book, is a powerful and important attempt to under-
stand nineteenth century legal development from a viewpoint that is
relevant to current legal concerns.
A not dissimilar article by Joel Brenner on "Nuisance Law and the
Industrial Revolution" 8 1 asks why the common law of nuisance did not
stand in the path of industrial development in nineteenth century
England. Unfortunately, however, Brenner makes inconsistent claims in
his attempt to decide whether judges who were seeking to promote the
interests of the entrepreneurial class consciously changed nuisance law
to attain that end or whether the structure of nuisance law itself, which
had always "had a zoning function . .. of allocating activities to ap.
propriate areas,"'8 2 merely permitted the development of industrial zones
once the economy placed a demand on society for them.
Robert Cover, like Horwitz and Brenner, also makes use of history
to address current questions about the apparently repressive nature of
law. The central object of his book, Justice Accused: Antislavery and
the Judicial Process,83 is to explain how judges were able to reject moral
claims for freedom that were advanced on the part of slaves between
the revolution and the Civil War. Much of the book consists of an
analysis of the formal assumptions of the judiciary-primarily the as-
sumption that judges ought not to engage in lawmaking as an act of
will-and of the moral underpinnings of those assumptions. Cover
thereby shows that the choices which judges confronted in slavery cases,
like most judicial choices, involved a complex conflict of competing
moralities. In effect, Cover, like Auerbach, Berry, Horwitz and Brenner,
is studying how instruments of oppression grow out of law which is
designed as a rational tool for the attainment of desired social ends.
Unlike the others, however, he recognizes that law often oppresses some
in the interest of the good of others.
Two older historians-Grant Gilmore and Willard Hurst-write
from a different, but equally powerful perspective. Essentially, Gilmore
81. Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. Legal Studies 403
(1974).
82. Id. at 406.
83. R. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (1975).
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and Hurst reject the idea that law can be rationally designed to ac-
complish any end. In a recent lecture, "Thoreau, Conscience and Law,'8
Hurst made the argument that law should never be understood as a
rational process of moral choice but must be viewed instead as a
process of compromising conflicting social interests. He does not appear
to have found American law repressive in the past, at least when it has
been made in a democratic legislative process. Since Hurst sees hope
only in democratic lawmaking, he urges that the duty of the courts
must be the improvement of the legislative processes through mechanisms
such as reapportionment and the encouragement of free expression and
association and not the articulation of fixed, morally derived doctrine.
Similarly, Grant Gilmore in a recent lecture, "The Age of Anx-
iety,"8 argues "that it is not possible to make a scientific statement
about . . . law,"8 6 because "law is always an instinctive response to
disorder, never a reasoned approach to the quite different problem of
achieving order."7s Gilmore's attitude also leads to the conclusion that
we will get our best results by leaving lawmaking to the political process
rather than in the hands of professionals striving to develop a scientific
statement of the law.
An article on late nineteenth century railroad regulation88 leads
me, at least, to be wary of law that is hammered out in the political pro-
cess. Its author, Albro Martin, summarizes recent work on railroad
regulation and concludes that the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
advanced no rational program of regulation and served little real pur-
pose. He writes:
What the nation required in 1887 was a body which could
proceed to cartelize the railroads; but the acts of 1887 and 1890
were a bundle of contradictory compromises which prohibited
every kind of concerted action the railroads had tried up to that
time. In determining the outcome of the bumbling efforts to
establish meaningful federal regulation, the practical desire for a
stable rate structure was less important than the deep-seated mis-
trust, hatred, and fear of large, insulated aggregations of power.
This attitude has always rested at the heart of American egali-
tarianism .... A new kind of power, in many ways more pervasive
than political power, had emerged by the 1870s. If they could
prevent it, Americans were not going to allow great concentrations
84. Hurst, Thoreau, Conscience and Law, 19 S.D.L. Rev. 1 (1974).
85. Gilmore, The Storrs Lectures: The Age of Anxiety, $4 Yale L.J. 1022 (1975).
86. Id. at 1041.
87. Id. at 1044.
88. Martin, The Troubled Subject of Railroad Regulation in the Gilded Age: A
Reappraisal, 61 J. Am. Hist. 339 (1974).
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of economic power to continue .... [T]he people certainly were
not going to lend the support of the state to the creation and
perpetuation of such power .... Most Americans who had to deal
with the railroad problem knew the price, in dollars and cents, of
a continuation of destructive competition, but they were willing, in
fact insisted on being allowed, to pay the price. Railroad men them-
selves sensed this opposition and some, like the testy A. B. Stickney,
opposed pooling ....
Even so, railroads were "cartelized." Consolidation, which rail-
road men had warned against throughout the last third of the nine-
teenth century, was the inevitable alternative to pooling. It be-
came a reality by the first decade of the twentieth century. By 1906
the major railroads were neatly packaged into some six or seven
systems. This process had begun in earnest with the passage of the
Act of 1887 .... 80
Martin's study of railroad regulation makes it plain, in short, that
Americans must engage in rational legal ordering to avoid legal chaos
and social waste. In returning to rationality, we must, of course, keep in
mind the writings of critics such as Robert Cover and Morton Horwitz,
who properly remind us of the repressive effects that rational legal
schemes can have. But their emphasis upon the occasional repressive
effects of the law must not cause us to ignore the law's accomplishments
over the long course of American history. Although the few legal his-
torians who have abandoned purely professional concerns and evaluated
our legal traditions during the past two years have been rather critical
of them, their critical approach is not an inevitable one. History can
also fulfill the function of identifying the legal traditions that we still
value and linking them with the social conditions that underlie them.
In the coming years, perhaps, legal history will begin to do so.
89. Id. at 370-71.
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DEFINITION OF A SECURITY
T he Forman Case.-This year's survey of securities regulation begins
with the evolving definition of the term "security" under the
federal securities laws.' The only Supreme Court decision in this area
during the last two years was United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman.
2
The question in Forman was whether the "stock" purchased by
residents of the New York City middle income housing project known as
Co-Op City was a security within the meaning of the Securities Act of
1933 (Securities Act or 1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act or 1934 Act).3 Residents of Co-Op City were re-
quired to purchase stock in the operating company. The stock could not
be pledged or otherwise encumbered, and, since it was nontransferable
except to a surviving spouse or to an eligible purchaser of the apartment,
when a tenant desired to leave, he was required to resell his stock to the
operating company. Alternatively, if the operating company declined to
purchase, the sale had to be made to the eligible tenant. In either case,
Submitted for publication June 1, 1976.
Richard D. Katcher is a member of the New York Bar.
1. Section 3 (a) (10) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c
(a)(10) (1970), provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, pre-
organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract.
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days
of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Section 2(3) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970), contains a
similar definition. The Supreme Court has held the definitions to be interchangeable.
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967). See also the definitions of "security"
in § 2(a)(16) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(16)
(1970) and § 202(a)(18) of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18)
(1970) and § 2a(36) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36)
(1970).
2. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(I), 78c(a)(10) (1970). See note 1 supra.
443
Imaged with the Pemission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
HeinOnline  -- 1976 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 443 1976
1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
the required price was the $25 per share initially paid by the departing
tenant.4 Accordingly, an owner could not profit from sale of his stock.
The stock had no voting rights-each apartment had one vote. Rental
payments were used to pay interest and principal on the mortgage and
to pay operating expenses of the project. The project also provided
washing machines and parking facilities for its tenants and leased pro-
fessional offices and commercial facilities.5
The plaintiffs brought suit under section 17 (a) of the 1933 Act0
and section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act,7 alleging that the information bul-
letin on which they relied in purchasing their apartments was false and
misleading. The bulletin stated that the contractor would bear construc-
tion costs above a certain amount, and the tenants alleged that they
were being charged for these costs by way of increased rental charges.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed the complaint,8 holding that the use of the term "stock"
with reference to the shares did not make them securities under the
federal securities laws. Relying on the Supreme Court opinions in
Securities & Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co.,9 and Securities
& Exchange Commission v. Joiner Leasing Corp.,lo the court specifically
found that the shares were not "investment contracts" within the statu-
tory definition." The Second Circuit reversed1 2 and held that since the
shares were called "stock," they were covered by the federal securities
laws.1 3 That court, also relying on Howey, found the shares to be "in-
vestment contracts" since the plaintiffs had invested money in a common
enterprise with an expectation of profit.14 The Second Circuit identified
three elements of profit. First, because of the presence of commercial
facilities, the tenants paid less rent than they would have absent such
facilities. Second, the court found the tax deduction afforded the tenants
by means of the interest payment on the mortgage was profit. Finally,
plaintiffs actually realized profit since their subsidized housing was
cheaper than comparable unsubsidized housing.1'
4. If the tenant sold to another eligible tenant, the seller could in addition
recoup a fraction of the mortgage paid-off through his rental payments. 421 U.S. at
842-43.
5. Id. at 855-56.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
7. Id. § 78j(b); and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1ob-5
(1975).
8. 366 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
9. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
10. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
I1. 366 F. Supp. at 1128. See text of definition in note 1 supra.
12. 500 F.2d 12,16 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
13. Id. at 1252. See note 1 supra.
14. 500 F.2d at 1253-54.
15. Id. at 1254-55.
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Applying an economic reality test, the Supreme Court reversed.10
The Court held that the mere fact that a share is called "stock" does not
bring it within the statutory definition of a security.' 7 Citing the House
Report accompanying the 1933 Act,18 the Court found that the Co-Op
City stock lacked the characteristics that "in our commercial world fall
within the ordinary concept of a security."9o The shares paid no divi-
dends and had none of the other characteristics generally associated
with stock. They were not negotiable, could not be pledged, had no
voting rights in proportion to the amount owned, and could not ap-
preciate in value. In short, the inducement to purdase this stock was
to acquire subsidized housing and not to make a profit.
2 0
Rejecting the position of the Second Circuit, the Court also held
that the stock was not an investment contract since the plaintiffs did
not expect to receive profits, at least in the traditional sense. "Profits"
was found to mean either earnings resulting from the use of the in-
vestors' funds or capital appreciation resulting from the development of
the initial investment.2 ' The income tax advantage was not income or
profits since, according to the Court, such benefits are available to any
homeowner paying mortgage interest. Similarly, the fact that subsidized
housing may be cheaper than comparable unsubsidized housing did
not result in profits since it has nothing to do with managerial efforts.
2 2
Finally, the Court stated that the expectation of profits required by the
statutory definition must be more than an insignificant one, holding
that any income from the commercial and other facilities was "too
speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction within the
Securities Acts."
2 3
The Forman opinion also indicated that the manner in which a
share is offered may bear on whether it is a security within the statutes.
The Court noted that the information bulletin distributed to potential
Co-Op City tenants emphasized the advantages of cooperative living,
not the ability to profit upon resale of an apartment.2 4 Indeed, the
Court gave weight to the fact that the bulletin emphasized the nonprofit
nature of the transaction and did not mention the provision of com-
mercial facilities.2 5 The analysis implies that when a buyer is drawn by
16. 421 U.S. at 847.
17. Id. at 848.
18. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1933).
19. 421 U.S. at 851.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 851-52.
22. Id. at 855.
23. Id. at 856 & n.21. The Court found the facilities were present not for potential
profits, but in order to make essential services available to the tenants. Id.
24. Id. at 853-54.
25. Id. at 854, 856.
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a desire to use or consume the item purchased, the securities laws are
inapplicable to the transaction. 26 As a result, the Forman opinion raises
but does not decide the more difficult issue of whether the traditional
cooperative apartment investment is subject to the securities laws.27
Other Developments: Investment Contracts.-A recent decision of
major significance on the subject of investment contracts is Daniel v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,2 8 where a district court held
that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to a
compulsory, noncontributory union pension plan. The plaintiff, who
was denied retirement benefits, alleged that the union in violation of
both securities acts had misrepresented conditions on his receipt of
benefits. 29 The court rejected the historical position of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) that a compulsory, noncontributory plan
does not involve the sale of a security and held that the employee had
purchased an investment contract within the statutory definition of
security.A0 The court found a voluntary sale in the diversion of a por-
tion of the employees' wages to the plan since the employees were re-
quired to vote in favor of such diversion as part of the union contract.
The anticipated retirement benefits constituted the required expecta-
tion of profits since the estimated total of the payout exceeded the
contributions. Finally, in recognition of the "risk capital" test, the court
also noted that the plan ultimately may be unable to fund the benefits,
and therefore the employee assumed some risk.8 '
In the area of investment contracts covered by the statutory def-
initions of securities, the "managerial efforts" test has received further
treatment in a number of specific contexts. Generally, the test provides
that if the seller or promoter in a transaction provides managerial
services upon which the investor relies, an investment contract within
the securities laws is created. 32 For example, in three no action positions
26. See id. at 852-53.
27. See id. at 859 n.26. The Forman Court did acknowledge the so-called "risk
capital" test (see Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 369 P.2d 960,
13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961)), but declined to express an opinion on it. The Court stated
that were it inclined to accept the test, the required risk would necessarily be a risk
of fluctuating value traditionally associated with securities investments. 421 U.S. at
857 n.24. See also Grenader v. Spitz, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
ff 95,523 (2d Cir. April 28, 1976), petition for cert. filed, 376 BNA Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. A-1I (Oct. 18, 1976) (No. 76-541) (sale of stock in cooperative apartment not a
sale of a security within securities laws).
28. 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Il. 1976).
29. Id. at 543-44.
30. Id. at 552-53. For text of the statutory definition, see note I supra.
31. 410 F. Supp. at 550-51. See note 27 supra. See generally Mundhchn & Hender-
son, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit Sharing I'lans,
29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 795 (1964).
32. See, e.g., SEC v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., [1975-76 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 95,388 (D.D.C. 1975); Jenson v. Continental Fin. Corp., 401
Imaged with the Pemission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
HeinOnline  -- 1976 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 446 1976
SECURITIES REGULATION
with respect to the sale of gold,33 the SEC staff position is that it will
not consider an investment contract created if the seller or promoter
does not provide essential managerial efforts upon which the investor
must rely to make a profit.3 4 In order to avoid a finding of an invest-
ment contract, the sale must be for cash and not on margin, the de-
pository arrangements must be limited to providing insurance and a
receipt entitling the purchaser to take possession of the gold, and the
seller or the promoter must not be obligated to repurchase the gold or
sell it for the account of the investor.
3 5
The managerial efforts criterion has also been important to deci-
sions involving discretionary commodity futures contracts trading ac-
counts. If a broker has control over the account or if the investor relies
on the broker for investment decisions, an investment contract will be
created even though the account may not be denominated a discretion-
ary account. This position was upheld in Scheer v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.3 6 where the court held an account to be a
discretionary account by reason of the manner in which it was operated.
In Rochkind v. Reynolds Securities, Inc.,3 7 the court held that a pooling
of accounts is not a prerequisite to finding an investment contract-the
only element necessary to an investment contract in this regard is that
the investor's fate be intertwined with the promoter's.3 8 If the investor is
more than tangentially involved in the investment decisions, however,
there is no investment contract. In Baker v. H.S. Kipnis 6 Co.30 and
F. Supp. 792 (D. Minn. 1975); SEC v. Western Pac. Gold & Silver Exch. Corp., [1974-75
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 95,064 (D. Ncv. 1975). Sec also SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
33. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,156 (Dec. 26, 1974). The rcstric-
tions on private ownership of gold by United States citizens wcrc removed effective
December, 1974.
34. Id. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481-83 (9h Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
35. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11.156 (Dec. 26, 1974). In a later
letter, the staff did not object to a seller publicly indicating its %icw on the ad-
visability of a gold investment. Deak & Co., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 80,395 (SEC Oct. 3, 1975). If the seller advises at what price to purdase or
sell, a question may arise whether such scrvices represent managerial efforts essential
to the ability to make a profit. See, e.g., Investment Rarities, Inc.. [1975-76 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 80,235 (SEC June 3, 1975). See also SEC v. Brigadoon
Scotch Distrib. Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding invttment contract in
sale of coin portfolios because of promoter's inanagement input).
36. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,0% (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
There is still a split among the federal circuits on whether a discretionary commodity
futures contract account is a security. See Glazer %. National Commodity Research &
Statistical Serv., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. 111. 1974).
37. 388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975).
38. Id. at 257. See also A.G. Edwards 9. Sons, [197.1-75 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 80,153 (SEC Mar. 28, 1975).
39. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. c 95,349 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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Bartley v. P.G. Commodities Associates, Inc.,40 the courts refused to find
investment contracts in the face of evidence that the plaintiffs partici-
pated in the investment decisions with the defendants."
In the area of real estate developments, there were two decisions in
1975 which held investments in real estate not to be securities. In both
Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc.4 2 and Happy Investment Group v.
Lakeworld Properties, Inc.4 3 the courts found that land was offered as a
residential development rather than an investment, and that while the
developer may have provided roads and other improvements, these were
not essential "managerial" services. In neither case did the developer
enter into a management contract or promise to operate the project and
distribute profits, nor did the developer obligate himself to create a
thriving community. Essentially, the courts refused to convert land sales
to securities in the absence of some common enterprise. In Cook v.
Farrell,4 4 however, the court held that an investment contract was
created where investors purchased land and gave the seller a power of
attorney to operate the land.
4 5
Another area which witnessed development in the past year con-
cerns large denomination investments which are divided and relis-
tributed. The question which frequently arises is whether the partici-
pation interests are securities. In National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., 46 the SEC staff took the position that the pooling by
brokers of customers' funds to acquire interests in institutional loans
created a security. In Prudential-American Securities, Inc.,"7 however,
the staff took the position, presumably because of the individualized
nature of the transaction, that the purchase of a banker's acceptance
from a bank by a broker for the accounts of four customers does not
create a security under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The bank's
confirmations reflected the names of the customers, and their percentage
interests. 4 8
Finally, three recent cases make it clear that a limited partnership
40. Id. 95,394 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
41. See also A.B.A. Auto Lease Corp. v. Adam Indus., Inc., 387 F. Stipp. 531 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) (franchisees' efforts preclude a finding of an investment contract).
42. 401 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
43. 396 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
44. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,337 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
45. See rule 3a 12-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a 12-(5) (1976), which conditionally exempts
from Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.1, and § 1l(d) of the 1934 Act, the extension of
credit by brokers in connection with investment contracts involving direct ownership
of residential real property.
46. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 80,130 (SEC Feb. 23, 1975).
See also Undenvood, Neuhaus & Co., id. ff 80,187 (SEC Feb. 13, 1975).
47. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 80,106 (SEC 1971).
48. Id. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 72, 107 (1970); 1.5 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. V, 1975).
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interest is a security. 49 In Hirsch v. du Pont,5o the court analyzed at
length the elements of an investment contract and noted that because a
general partner had the power to participate in the control of the af-
fairs of the business, his interest was not an investment contract.
Furthermore, a limited partnership interest is an investment contract,
even if the holder later becomes a general partner51 The Hirsch court
also acknowledged that a general partnership interest may be an invest-
ment contract if the general partner does not have voting power52
II
Ruriz lOb-5
The Supreme Court's recent conservative approach to the construc-
tion of the federal securities laws is perhaps most evident in the two
rule 1Ob-553 cases decided by the Court: Blue Chip Stamps to. Manor
Drug Stores54 and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.5 Each should have a
significant impact in limiting the growth of litigation under the rule,
because of both the specific holdings and the theory expressed in the
opinions.
Blue Chip Stamps and the Purchaser-Seller Requirement.-In Blue
Chip Stamps the Supreme Court affirmed the rule, established twenty-
three years earlier by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp.56 that a plaintiff who has neither purchased nor sold securities
49. McGreghar Land Co. v. Meguiar, [1975-76 Transfer Binderi CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. j 95,273 (9th Cir. 1975); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975):
New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Sloan, 391 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
50. 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
51. Id. at 1228.
52. Id. at 1221.
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), promulgated under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The rule proxides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the me of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of tle mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in die light of tile
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in cofntctkio with the
purchase or sale of any security.
54. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
55. 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
56. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). For a disct~siion of
the previous demise of the Birnbaum rule, see Lowenfels, The Demise of lie Bi n-
baum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54 Va. L. Rev. 268 (1968); Note. Sctliti
Regulation, 1974/75 Ann. Suricy Am. L. 129, 144-48.
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may not maintain a private cause of action for money damages under
rule 1Ob-5. Blue Chip Stamps arose out of a 1967 antitrust consent decree
under which Blue Chip Stamp Company, which was in the business of
providing trading stamps to retailers, would be reorganized, and a sub-
stantial number of shares of the reorganized company would be offered
to retailers who were not previously shareholders of the company. The
offering of the Blue Chip shares was registered under the Securities Act
and slightly more than fifty percent of the offering was purchased.
Plaintiff, a former user of the stamp service and an offeree of Blue
Chip shares, brought suit two years after the offering on behalf of
itself and all other offerees who had not purchased in the offering.
Plaintiff alleged that the prospectus used in connection with the offer-
ing of Blue Chip shares was materially misleading in that it was overly
pessimistic in presenting the company's status and prospects. 7 The
district court dismissed the complaint on the basis of the Birnbaum
rule,5 8 and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the facts warranted
an exception to the rule.59
The Supreme Court based its affirmance of the Birnbaum rule on
four grounds: precedent, history, statutory analysis, and policy. As to
precedent and history, the Court referred to the wealth of lower court
decisions accepting Birnbaum and to the congressional declinations in
1957 and 1959 to amend section 10 (b) of the Exchange Act to make it
applicable to "attempts" to purchase or sell. s 0 These factors, the Court
said, taken together "[argue] significantly in favor of the [adoption of
the] Birnbaum rule by this Court." 6' In its statutory analysis the Court
noted that the principal express civil liability provisions of the Exchange
Act and the Securities Act are, by their terms, available only to pur-
chasers or sellers 2 and concluded that "[i]t would indeed be anomalous
57. 421 U.S. at 726.
58. 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
59. 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit, stating that one of the
essential reasons for the Birnbaum rule was the difficulty of ascertaining the amount
of damages suffered by a nonpurchasing offerce, found that the difficulty did not
exist under the Blue Chip consent decree. Id. at 141. Indeed, the decree specifically
set out the total number of shares to be offered to stamp users who were previously
not stockholders, and contained a formula to determine how many shares wcre to be
offered to each based on the quantity of stamps issued to each user during a designated
period. The offering price was also set by the consent decree. Id. at 139. Since the
decree thus created a class of nonpurchasing offerees with no accompanying unccr.
tainties as to how much or at what price they would have purchased, the court held
that the Birnbaum rule did not apply. Id. at 142. Judge Hufstedler dissented, finding
the lack of unascertainable damages not determinative of standing. Id. at 142-48. See
text at note 66 infra.
60. 421 U.S. at 732-33. See Hearings Before Subcomm. of Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing & Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1959); S. 2545, 85th Cong., 1st Scss. (1957).
61. 421 U.S. at 733.
62. Id. at 736. Sections 11(a) and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k(a), 771 (1970), are available only to persons "acquiring" or "purchasing" the
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to impute to Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a
judicially implied cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for
comparable express causes of action."
0 3
The Court conceded, however, that analysis of the congressional
enactment did not offer conclusive guidance and that it was therefore
proper to weigh "policy considerations"' ' 4 in determining the propriety
of the Birnbaum rule. The Court was particularly concerned that
abandonment of the purchaser-seller requirement would result in a
proliferation of "strike" suits and a concomitantly increased burden
on corporate time and money, with the outcome of such suits determined
almost entirely by oral testimony.65 In addition, the Court rejected tile
position of the Court of Appeals that an exception to Birnbaum was
warranted because the plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of an antitrust
decree and thus a limited and identifiable class. The Court stated that
if it were to agree with the Ninth Circuit in this regard, it "would leave
the Birnbaum rule open to endless case-by-case erosion depending oil
whether a particular group of plaintiffs was thought... to be sufficiently
more discrete than the world of potential purchasers at large to justify
an exception.1
66
While the Court's language does not appear to augur well for the
viability of some of the previously created judicial exceptions to the
Birnbaum doctrine,67 their future will have to await further judicial
action.68 Nevertheless, it is clear that in certain circumstances a person
security. Sections 9 and 18 of the Exchange Act, id. §S 78j(c). 78r(a). arc available
only to persons "who shall purchase or sell any security" or "who .. . shall have
purchased or sold a security," respectively.
63. 421 U.S. at 736.
64. Id. at 737.
65. Id. at 742.
66. Id. at 755.
67. See Jacobs, Standing to Sue Under lOb-5 After Blue Chip Stamps. 3 Sec. Reg.
L.J. 387 (1976); Comment, 44 Ford. L. Rev. 452 (1975).
68. The conservative purchaser-seller holding of Blue Chip will undoubtedly have
ramifications beyond that specific standing context, and these ramifications are be-
ginning to emerge. For example, Bio-Medical Sciences, Inc. v. Weinstein, 107 F. Supp.
970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), involved an action by a corporation against its former president's
estate alleging that he had fraudulently induced institutional lenders to purchase
convertible debt securities from the corporation. When the misrepresenzations Ivere
discovered, the corporation was forced to its detriment to renegotiate the terns of
the debt. The court, taking its cue from Blue Chip, rejected the corporation's 1Ob.5
argument, holding that the "'in connection with" requirement of the rule mandated
that the loss result from the sale itself and not merely have some relationship to the
sale. Id. at 973. Although the holding of Blue Chip was irrele -t to tle Bio-Medical
issues, it was viewed as indicating that "the judicial oak' should be trimmed back
rather than force-fed." Id. See also Myers v. American Leisure Time Enterprises.
[1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. c 95.286 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Blue
Chip would be frustrated by permitting a target company shareholder who had
neither purchased nor sold securities to maintain a damage action under § 13(d) of
the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970)).
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who is neither a purchaser nor a seller in the conventional sense will be
able to maintain a private damage action under rule lOb-5. The lower
courts, with apparent approval of the Blue Chip Court,00 have held that
since the Exchange Act defines "purchase" to include a contract to
purchase, and "sale" to include a contract to sell,7 0 parties to such con-
tracts have the status of purchasers or sellers for purposes of the pur-
chaser-seller requirement.
In Camp v. Genesco,71 the District Court for the Southern District of
New York found that the holder of convertible preferred stock who
alleged that defendant's misrepresentations caused him not to convert
had a claim under rule lOb-5, since the conversion right was the equiva-
lent of a contract. Similarly, Wulc v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc.7 2
held that the holder of unexercised options to purchase shares in an
issuer which was merged into another company had standing to main-
tain a lOb-5 action for misrepresentation in connection with the merger,
since the option was a contract to sell securities. In Davis v. Davis,73 the
Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff who was party to a contract to sell
stock and who alleged a fraudulent scheme to cut off his financial rc-
sources to force him to sell at a fraction of the contract price had stand-
ing under rule lOb-5. In a different factual context, Murphy v. Hillwood
Villa Associates74 held that a party to a contract had standing as a seller
under rule IOb-5 where the defendant allegedly fraudulently induced
plaintiff to make payment under the contract to the wrong party. Finally,
Desser v. Ashton7 5 held that an oral contract to purchase or sell securi-
ties, while perhaps not enforceable under a statute of frauds, was never-
theless sufficient to confer on the plaintiff purchaser or seller status in
satisfaction of the Blue Chip requirement.
While it is clear under Blue Chip that mere retention of an invest-
ment in reliance on misrepresentation is not actionable under rule
lOb-5,76 Fischer v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc. 77 held that an agree-
ment to extend a loan which would otherwise come due constituted a
new purchase for rule lOb-5 purposes, and New York Stock Exchange,
Inc. v. Sloan78 held that the failure to demand repayment of a loan
69. See 421 U.S. at 750-51.
70. See id. at 750 n.13. The definitions are contained in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(c)(13)-(14)
(1970).
71. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. jj 95,473 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17,
1976).
72. 400 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
73. 526 F.2d 1286, 1289 (5th Cir. 1976).
74. 411 F. Supp. 287, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
75. 408 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
76. See 421 U.S. at 737-38.
77. 408 F. Supp. 745, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
78. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 95,480 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25,
1976).
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made under an agreement providing for automatic renewal absent de-
mand also constituted a new purchase.
The Birnbaum rule has been held to apply to situations in which
an issuer is the purchaser or seller of its own securities. In llright v.
Heizer Corp.79 the court held that shareholders of a corporate seller of
securities could not maintain a private 1Ob-5 action individually, but
could maintain the action derivatively on behalf of the corporation, and
Harriman v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.80 held that shareholders of
a corporation party to an unconsummated merger could maintain a
derivative action. In an interesting contrast, the Wright court concluded
that, while Blue Chip involved a claim for damages, the purchaser-seller
requirement should also be read into private actions for injunctive
relief.8 ' Harriman stated that the line of cases not requiring purchaser
or seller status in injunctive actions "arguably retain[s post-Blue Chip]
vitality."
8 2
Hochelder and the Scienter Requirement.-In Ernst & Ernst t'.
Hochfelder,83 the Supreme Court, reversing the Seventh Circuit, held
that a private cause of action for damages may not be brought under
section 10 (b) and rule lOb-5 in the absence of an allegation of "scienter,"
which the Court stated "refers to a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud."8 4
As in Blue Chip, the Court based its holding on several grounds:
the language of the statute, legislative history, the circumstances sur-
rounding the promulgation of the rule, and an analysis of the express
civil liability provisions in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, found that the use of the
words "manipulative or deceptive" in conjunction with "device or con-
trivance" in the statute "strongly suggest[s] that section 10 (b) was in-
tended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct,"8 since such
language "clearly connotes intentional misconduct .. . .,86 This inter-
pretation of the statutory language was bolstered by the Court's analy-
sis of the legislative history, which was viewed as indicating that the
section was meant to control "manipulative [or cunning] devices."8 7 The
rule itself was a "hastily drafted response to a situation clearly involving
79. 411 F. Supp. 23, 31 (N.D. I1. 1975).
80. 411 F. Supp. 133, 157 (D. Del. 1975).
81. 411 F. Supp. at 23-34.
82. 411 F. Supp. 133, 157. See e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Centsco. Inc. 38-1 F.2d
540 (3d Cir. 1973); Kahan v. Rosenstiel. 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 398 U.S.
950 (1970); Britt v. C)il Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969).
83. 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976), rev'g 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
84. Id. at 1381.
85. Id. at 1383.
86. Id. at 1384.
87. Id. at 1386.
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intentional misconduct."8 8 The intent of Congress and the SEC, there-
fore, was not to adopt a broad rule but merely to limit market frauds.80
The Court stated that "[i]n each instance that Congress created express
civil liability in favor of purchasers or sellers of securities it clearly
specified whether recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional
conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent mistake."90 Analyzing sections
11, 12 (2) and 15 of the 1933 Act, the Court noted that those sections
allow recovery for negligent conduct subject to "significant procedural
restrictions not applicable under 10(b)." 91 The Court explained:
We think these procedural limitations indicate that the judicially
created private damage remedy under § 10(b)-which has no com-
parable restrictions-cannot be extended, consistently with the in-
tent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent wrongdoing. Such
extension would allow causes of action covered by § 11, § 12(2) and
§ 15 to be brought instead under § 10(b) and thereby nullify the
effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on these
express actions.
92
While the Court specifically disclaimed a position on whether reck-
lessness is a form of intentional misconduct,93 it also left the impression
that something less than actual intent may provide the basis for a sec-
tion 10(b) action. Thus, the Court stated that "the relevant portions of
that [legislative] history support our conclusion that § 10(b) was ad-
dressed to practices that involve some element of scienter and cannot be
read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone."94 At another point,
the opinion states that "there is no indication ... that § 10(b) was in-
tended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter."95 The Court also
ratified a description of the section "as a 'catch-all' to enable the Com-
mission to 'deal with new manipulative [or cunning] devices.' It is
difficult to believe that any lawyer, legislative draftsman or legislator
would use these words if the intent was to create liability for merely
negligent acts or omissions." 96 Finally, the Court stated that "[t]here is
no indication that Congress intended anyone to be made liable for such
practices [wash sales, matched orders and other illicit trading practices]
88. Id. at 1390 n.32.
89. Id. at 1387, 1390.
90. Id. at 1388.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1389.
93. Id. at 1381 n.12.
94. Id. at 1385 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 1387 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 1385 (emphasis added).
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unless he acted other than in good faith. The catch-all provision of § 10
(b) should be interpreted no more broadly.'"'9
The opinion expressly leaves open several other questions:
o The Court does not consider whether civil liability for aiding
and abetting is appropriate under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 or the
elements necessary to establish such a cause of action.08
o The Court does not consider whether scienter is a necessary ele-
ment in an action for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and rule
IOb-5.99
o The Court does not consider whether a cause of action may be
maintained under section 10(b) on the basis of a violation of section 18
of the 1934 Act which provides for a private cause of action by any
person against any other person who makes a materially misleading
statement in 1934 Act commission filings. The Court notes that the
legislative history surrounding section 18 "suggests something more than
negligence on the part of the defendant is required for recovery."
00
Materiality and Reliance.-Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen,101 contains
a brief but lucid explanation by Judge Waterman of the relationship
between materiality and reliance as elements of a rule lOb-5 damage
cause of action. The court noted that the elements of materiality and
reliance restrict the applicability of the rule to those situations where
there is causation in fact between the alleged wrong and the injury,
97. Id. at 1387 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 1380 n.7. See e.g., Woodward .. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975);
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975); Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524
F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975); Aid Auto Stores v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1975); H.L.
Federman & Co. v. Greenberg, 405 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. Sorg Printing
Co., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. c 95,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
99. 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n.12. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun (joined by Justice
Brennan) stated he could see no distinction betwieen an injuncti'e action brought by
the SEC and a private damage action, "for surely the question whether negligent
conduct violates the Rule should not depend on the plaintiffs identity." Id. at 1392.
In a memorandum to all staff attorneys (BNA Sec. Reg. L. Rep.. No. 354. at F-I
(May 26, 1976)) the General Counsel of the SEC warns the staff that it is to be
anticipated that the Hochfelder issue will be raised by defense counsel attempting to
resist SEC injunctive actions and sets forth **initial observations" releant to resisting
such efforts. Included among such suggestions are that the staff axoid allegations of
willful or reckless conduct and instead allege only that the defendants "violated" the
statute so that there will be flexibility in proving the case while aoiding the risk of
being required to meet a more difficult standard, and tiat, particularly in cases where
"proof of knowledge is slim," the staff avoid "aiding and abetting' allgations and
instead allege that the defendants violated the statute "directly or indirectly." The
memorandum also suggests that whenever possible the staff allege violations of provi-
sions in addition to rule lOb-5, "'particularly Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, which
may not be subject to the scienter requirements of Section 10(b)."
100. 96 S. Ct. at 1389-91 & n.31.
101. 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975).
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since causation is a necessary element in a private damage action. In
cases where there is affirmative misstatement, plaintiff must prove both
materiality and reliance. In nondisclosure cases, however, direct proof
of reliance is not possible, and proof of materiality (i.e., whether a
reasonable man would have attached importance to the omitted fact in
determining his course of conduct) becomes decisive in determining
whether causation exists.
102
In the Ninth Circuit, Blackie v. Barrack'0 3 held that the proof of
subjective reliance on misrepresentations was unnecessary to establish a
lOb-5 claim alleging a deception which inflated the price of a publicly
traded security. The court found that in the impersonal stock exchange
context, proof of materiality of the misrepresentation established the
reliance of at least some market traders which led to the inflation of the
price of the security. When the plaintiff purchased at the inflated price
the element of causation between the misrepresentation and the injury
was established. Of course, the defendant was free to disprove the ele-
ment of causation by showing either a lack of materiality (or that despite
materiality an insufficient number of traders relied to affect the price),
or that the individual plaintiff knew of the falsity of the statement or
would have purchased even had he known of the falsity of the state-
ment. 0 4
In SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc.,10 5 Judge Friendly dealt with the
question of the materiality of selective disclosure of preliminary negotia-
tions relating to a potential merger of Geon into a substantially larger
company.' 06 In holding such information material, the court stressed
that the concept of materiality in the context of disclosure of inside in-
formation to a favored few "has a different aspect than when the issue
[of materiality] is, for example, an inaccuracy in a publicly disseminated
press release .. 0.. ,, 7 In addition, the court suggested that such selectively
disclosed information may be material simply because of its source. In
response to defendant's assertions that the information with respect to
early stage discussions is immaterial per se, the court held that materiality
depends both on the likelihood that the potential event would occur,
and on the magnitude of such event:
102. Id. at 239. For the Supreme Court's formulation of the materiality standard
in the proxy statement context, see note 129 infra.
103. 524 F.2d 891, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3220 (U.S.
Oct. 4, 1976).
104. Id. at 904-06.
105. 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
106. Id. at 47-49.
107. Id. at 48.
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Since a merger in which it is bought out is the most important event
that can occur in a small corporation's life, to wit, its death, we
think that inside information, as regards a merger of this sort, can
become material at an earlier stage than would be the case as re-
gards lesser transactions-and this even though the mortality rate
of mergers in such formative stages is doubtless high.1 0s
The court, however, expressly noted that its holding did not mean
that public disclosure of the preliminary stage negotiations was either
necessary or appropriate absent the selective disclosure. Premature dis-
semination of such information might itself be misleading because of
the possibility of creating unfounded market activity. The court con-
cluded that during such preliminary stages, "silence is indeed golden.''" 0
At a later stage of the merger discussions involved in Geon, the
corporation's president informed certain persons that the directors would
meet shortly to "rubber stamp" the transaction. The court held that a
board meeting to act upon a proposed merger is clearly material in-
formation. It is a signal for arbitrageurs to narrow the price gap, and the
call for such a meeting should either be kept confidential (with a ban
on insider trading and tipping) or publicly disclosed.110
Duty to Investigate and Access to Information.-Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Ross,ll decided by the Second Circuit, pointed out the
danger in a corporate acquisition transaction of attempting to fulfill
disclosure requirements simply by allowing the purchaser access to
information. The court, in a situation where the relevant facts were
ascertainable from the books and records of the acquired corporation
but were apparently difficult to sift out, held that the disclosure re-
quirements of rule lOb-5 were not satisfied simply by giving the pur-
chaser access and permitting him to piece the facts together if he could.
108. Id. at 47-48.
109. Id. at 48. Geon also held that anl officer who gives false information on
the status of a proposed merger to a stock exchange official who is seeking such
information to determine whether to halt trading in the security violates rule 10b-5.
Id. at 49-50. The court acknowledged that the status of the transaction in Geon
was not sufficiently crystallized to call for a press release and that the officer could
have legally responded with -no comment" to inquiries from stockholders or brokers.
The officer, however, could not misstate the status of the proposed transaction to
the exchange or withhold information necessary to a determination on a trading
halt. Id. at 50.
110. Id. at 47.
Another disclosure case, Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660 (D. Md. 1975).
held that the duty to disclose under rule I0b-5 terminates at the time all parties arc
bound, and that therefore, there is no duty to disclose events occurring subsequently.
The court reasoned that the purpose of the rule is to prevent insiders and tippccs
from taking undue advantage of others, and not to provide an escape hatch for
avoiding transactions. Id. at 689-91.
111. 509 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Rather, the rule imposes an affirmative duty to disclose material facts. 1 12
Contrasted with the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer opinion is the subsequent
decision of the Southern District of New York in Caan v. Kane-Miller
Corp. x 33 In Caan, the court found that a reasonable inspection of the
acquired corporation's books would have revealed the allegedly material
facts, and it distinguished Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer on the basis of the
extent of the investigation there required. In the course of "complicated
merger negotiations, there is no affirmative duty to direct a sophis-
ticated purchaser .. to all routine information which it should be able
to uncover in the course of a reasonable investigation."' 1 4 Rule 10b-5,
the court stated, cannot be used as an "insurance policy" for persons who
choose "to disregard facts which would have been uncovered by any
reasonable person in their position."115
Similarly, Arlinghaus v. Ritenour" o held that a shareholder in a
closely held corporation who claimed that her counsel had purchased
her stock without telling her of negotiations to resell the stock at a
higher price, had not satisfied the diligence requirement implicit in
rule lOb-5. The court's holding turned on her failure to consult her
brother-in-law, who was a director of the corporation and in a position
to advise her of the value of her stock. In the Tenth Circuit, Holdsworth
v. Strong'1 7 noted that ordinarily a due diligence defense implicit in
rule lOb-5 cases will not bar a plaintiff's recovery if there has been an
intentional fraud by the defendant. The plaintiff in Holdsworth, who
was an officer and director of the issuer (a small corporation without
a readily ascertainable market value) was not barred even though he
made no investigation at all."18 Aixala v. W.E. Hutton & Co.119 held
that a subordinated lender to a brokerage firm was not barred from a
lOb-5 recovery by reason of his failure to request to examine another
subordinated loan agreement, the provisions of which the court found
would have been material to the plaintiff's decision to make the loan.
While the foregoing cases all involved "face-to-face" acquisition
transactions, similar due diligence principles have been applied in other
situations. For example, the court in Pollack v. Eastman Dillon120 held
that a plaintiff who made purchases based upon a broker's favorable
112. Id. at 933.
113. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 95,446 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5,
1976).
114. Id. at 99,242.
115. Id.
116. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 95,288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
117. 372 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. A-3 (10th Cir. Sept. 29, 1976) (en banc).
118. Id.
119. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,981 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
120. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,987 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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recommendation could not recover against the broker for failure to
reveal subsequent adverse information since such information was con-
tained in the issuer's published financial reports.
Conclusion.-While lOb-5 continues to be the source of the bulk of
securities litigation, the limiting effects of both Blue Chip and Hoch-
felder are just beginning to emerge. Clearly, the Supreme Court's gen-
erally conservative view of at least the private damage remedies avail-
able under the Exchange Act will permeate consideration of related issues
by the lower courts.'21 The far-reaching effects of the decisions, of course,
remain a topic to be covered in the future.
III
TAEOVERS
Resort to the federal courts continued to be a favorite tactic of a
management attempting to resist an unwanted takeover attempt. The
pattern of the decisions in large part continues to reflect congressional
intent that the Williams Act,122 which, along with various state laws,1 23
121. See, e.g., Bio-Medical Sciences, Inc. v. Weinstein, 407 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), discussed in note 68 supra.
122. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13d-e, 14d-f, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d).(c), n(d).
(f) (1970).
123. While the Williams Act has been the primary regulator of takeoer battles.
state tender offer statutes and proceedings promise to play an increasingly important
role. When the Williams Act was passed in 1968, Virginia was the only state with
takeover legislation. Va. Code Ann. §§ 13.1-528 to 13.1-541 (Replacement Vol. 1973).
Twenty-two other states currently have takeover statutes.
The state takeover laws are as follows: Alaska Stat. §§ 45.57.010-5.57.120 (1 Blue
Sky L. Rep. f 6,209 (June 8, 1976)); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-51.5.101 (Supp. 1975);
P.A. 76-362, [1976] Conn. Laws 729; Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 203 (1 Blue Sky L Rep.
j 11,131 (April 24, 1976)); Hawaii Rev. Stat. ch. 417E (Supp. 1975); Idaho Code % 30-
1501 to 30-1513 (Supp. 1975); Ind. Code §§ 23-2-3-1 to 23-2-3-12 (Burns Supp. 1976);
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-1276 to 17-1285 (IA Blue Sky L. Rep. 19,351-60 (Mar. 30.
1976)); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 292.560-292.630 (Baldwin Rev. Stat. Serv. 1976); La. Rev.
StaL Ann. §§ 51:1500-51:1512 (IA Blue Sky L. Rep. r 21,151-63 (June 28, 1976)); Md.
Ann. Code art. 11, §§ 901-08 (IA Blue Sky L. Rep. J J 23,421-27 (May 17. 1976)); ch. 121
[1976] Mass. Laws 125; P.A. 179 [1976] Mich. Laws 409; Minn. SLat. Ann. ch. 80B
(Supp. 1976); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 78.376-78.378 (1973); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law ch. 4. art.
16, §§ 1600-1613 (2 Blue Sky L. Rep. 35,351-64 (July 27, 1976)); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1975); Act 19 [1976] Pa. Laws 33; S.D. Compiled Laws
Ann. ch. 47-32 (Supp. 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-2101 to 48-2115 (3 Blue Sky L.
Rep. J 45,191-205 (Mar. 17, 1976)); ch. 30 [1976] Utah Laws 121; Wis. Stat. Ann. ch.
552 (Special Pamphlet 1975).
For a general discussion, see Vaughan, State Tender Offer Regulation, 9 Rev.
Sec. Reg. 969 (1976). Virtually all of the statutes require the filing of offering materials
a specified number of days before the offer is made. Many states also provide for
administrative hearings at the request of the target or upon motion of the state
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regulates takeover contests, be construed not to tip the balance toward
an entrenched management but to compel full and fair disclosure to
investors, while at the same time giving management and the offeror an
equal opportunity to fairly present their views.
12 4
Disclosure Requirements.-Recent cases have rejected a mechanical
approach to the determination of materiality of a particular disclosure
in favor of the more realistic approach of whether in the overall context
investors were given, or had readily available, sufficient information to
make an informed investment decision. Thus, Spielman v. General lost
Corp.125 defined materiality in the exchange offer-tender offer context
as follows:
[T]he fact that there is a contest for control means that a failure to
present information may be rendered harmless by disclosure from
others, such as the target company, the competing tenderor or out-
side sources. A defendant may not be faulted for failure to repeat
material information which has been publicly proclaimed in various
ways on other occasions....
The issue presented by this case, therefore, is . . . whether . . .
security holders were unable to make an informed investment
decision because of alleged deficiencies in the [offering material],
defects which . . . were never cured by information contained in
other communications to [the target's] shareholders.12 0
The court in Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum
Corp.,12 7 while recognizing that disclosure deficiencies can be cured by
publicly available information or disclosure by third parties, stated that
if the offeror limits the target's ability to respond by stipulating a short
offer period (there, eleven days), the offeror will be held to a higher
standard of disclosure.' 28
Since the total mix of information should be considered, the ap-
propriate question for a determination of materiality in the tender offer
context is whether a shareholder would have considered the omitted
fact or correct information important in reaching a decision whether
authority. Many also provide substantive rights which exceed those tinder the Williams
Act. For a discussion of the constitutionality of such legislation, see Note, Commerce
Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1133
(1974).
124. S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968); GAF Corp. v. Milstcin, 453 F.2d 709, 716-17 & n.16 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
125. 402 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
126. Id. at 194-95.
127. 394 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
128. Id. at 274-75 n.1.
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to tender.129 Thus, in Copperweld Corp. v. Inetal, o30 which involved
a cash tender offer by a French company for all of the outstanding
stock and convertible debentures of an American company, the court
held that the understatement of the offeror's earnings by approximately
$100 million, resulting from differences between French and American
accounting principles, was not material in that particular factual con-
text.131 The court reached its holding on the basis of its findings that
the understatement did not alter the "general heahh" of the offeror
or impair its ability to pay for the shares tendered and that the offer
price substantially exceeded the historical market price of the target's
shares. Under these circumstances, the court did not believe a reason-
able investor would find the earnings understatement important in
deciding whether to tender.
132
Specific Disclosure Problerns.-The plans, purposes, and proposals
disclosures required under the Williams Act133 produced several interest-
ing holdings during 1975. In Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K.
Porter Co.,13 the offer to purchase stated that the offeror had no in-
tention of seeking representation on the target's board of directors, but
that its offer, which if successful would have given it just under fifty
percent of the target's stock, was to increase its investment in the target
company, which might give the offeror "effective working control of
[the target]."'135 The court found, without casting any doubt on the
representation as to directors, that an offer designed to increase the
offeror's holdings to almost fifty percent would, if successful, achieve
control and that the statements on "investment" and "effective working
129. See, e.g., Spielman Y. General Host Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190. 194 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 39- F. Supp. 267, 274-
75 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969). For the question, presented in the context of an acquisi-
tion proxy statement, of whether the test is "would," "might," or would ha~c a -signif-
icant propensity" to affect shareholder decision, see TSC Indus.. Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1970);
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Northway, supra. In Northway, the Court reersed
the Seventh Circuit's formulation that material facts were those which a reason-
able investor "might" consider important, and defined a fact in te proxy context
to be material when "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote." but it is not neccssan to
show that correct disclosure would have caused the reasonable shareholder to ac-
tually change his vote. 96 S. Ct. at 2133.
130. 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
131. Id. at 602.
132. Id.
133. Section 13(d)(I)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(C) (1970); SEC Reg. 14d-IC, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(c)(4) (1976); Schedule 13D, Item 4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Item 4
(1976).
134. No. 75-1027C(A) (E.D. Mo., Nov. 26, 1975).
135. Id. at 11.
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control" did not meet the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act.1nI
Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman 37 held that if the acquiring company has
purchased shares for investment and to strengthen its position in antici.
pation of merger discussions, schedule 13D need only state that the
purpose of the purchase is "investment" as long as it also discloses that
a possible merger was or will be considered. 138 If the purpose of the
purchases is to frustrate a takeover by a third party, that fact must also
be disclosed.' 3 9 Alaska Interstate Co. v. 11ciV1illian further stipnlates
that legal or factual impediments to the accomplishment of the offeror's
purpose, such as expected opposition from the target or a third party,
are required items of disclosure.1 4
0
The question whether the offeror is required to disclose the details
of a plan to merge the target after consummation of a tender offer re.
ceived interesting treatment in two cases. In Otis Elevator Go. v. United
Technologies Corp. 4 1 the offeror, prior to its offer, had attempted to
negotiate a "friendly" merger with the target. In connection with the
attempt, the offeror prepared a study showing the effect on it of a cash
tender offer followed by a second-step merger using a specific exchange
ratio. The study was presented to the offeror's board when it approved
the cash tender offer, but the board did not act on the study or approve
the second-step merger. Neither the study nor the extensive consideration
given to it by officers of the offeror was disclosed in the offer to pur-
chase, which stated only that preliminary merger discussions were con-
ducted with the target, that the discussions had been terminated, and
that the offeror "ha[d] not formulated any plan or proposal to merge"
the target.' 4 2 In holding that the details of the merger plan should have
been disclosed and rejecting the offeror's argument that the plan was
"inchoate" and not material, the court stated that "a plan or proposal
will not be considered inchoate but rather .. material if there is strong
evidence of its adoption by high corporate officers over a period of
time."
43
In Alaska Interstate Co. v. AMcA'illian,144 on the other hand, the
136. Id. at 12.
137. 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
138. Id. at 237-39.
139. See id. at 239.
140. 402 F. Supp. 532, 550-53 (D. Del. 1975).
141. 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
142. Id. at 963. If instead of not acting on the merger plan, the board had
specifically rejected it, there would presumably have been sufficient evidence to show
that the offeror was not committed to the plan and no disclosure would have been
required. See Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937,
941 (2d Cir. 1969).
143. 405 F. Supp. at 971.
144. 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975).
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court found no evidence that a decision had been made by the board or
top management of the offeror on the terms of a merger between the
target and the offeror and, accordingly, refused to require disclosure of
"hypothetical" terms furnished to a bank which financed the offer. The
court noted that in every tender offer involving a possible combination
of the offeror and the target, the target will conduct analysis to deter-
mine the feasibility of its plan. If no specific terms have been decided
upon, reference to possible terms, even labeled as such, "will not
ordinarily provide a basis for informed stockholder judgment and will
hold some potential for miscommunication."1 45 In the absence of a
decision by the offeror on specifics, the Alaska Interstate court accepted
a general statement to the effect that a merger was desired by the offeror
and that the terms thereof would depend upon various factors and
could not then be predicted.'
40
In view of the Second Circuit's decisions in Green v. Santa Fe In-
dustries, Inc. and Marshel v. AFW Fabrics Corp.,t47 it may be that any
disclosure made with respect to possible merger plans to eliminate the
remaining minority interest in the target should be accompanied by
appropriate language drawing attention to such decisions and the effect
they may have on consummation of such plans.
The question of whether the offeror is required to include its
financial statements in an offer to purchase has also received judicial
attention since the beginning of 1975. Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal and
Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian both indicated that even though a
shareholder might find them important in reaching a decision on
whether or not to tender, the offeror's financial statements need not be
included in the offer to purchase if they are otherwise publicly avail-
able. 48 In Copperweld, the court found such availability by reason of
the inclusion of financial statements in the offeror's schedule 13D,
which was on file at the New York Stock Exchange and the SEC.' 40 The
Alaska Interstate court found such availability because the offeror was a
public company regularly filing the requisite periodic and annual re-
ports.150 The Copperweld court indicated its belief that the offeror's
145. Id. at 543. See Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075,
1085-86 (5th Cir. 1970).
146. 402 F. Supp. at 540-43.
147. See notes 200-20 infra and accompan)ing text.
148. 403 F. Supp. at 597; 402 F. Supp. at 548. Alaska Interstate implies that if all
tendered shares need not be accepted and a second-step merger in exchange for
securities of the offeror is contemplated, with the exchange ratio having already been
decided, financial statements of the offeror would be required to be included since
the offeror is in reality telling the targets shareholders to tender now for cash or
receive securities in the second-step merger. Id.
149. 403 F. Supp. at 598.
150. 402 F. Supp. at 546-47.
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financial statements are not material and thus not required to be made
public if the offer is to purchase all of the outstanding stock of the
target; but in cases similar to Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons,'"
where the offer is for only a part of the target's shares with a second-step
merger contemplated, or where the target may be the ultimate source of
funds for the offer, disclosure should be required if the information is
not otherwise publicly available.
1 2
Alaska Interstate found no duty on the part of the offeror to dis-
close its own judgment with respect to liquidation values of the target's
assets absent receipt of liquidating value appraisals from the target. If
such appraisals have been furnished by the target, the offeror can dis-
close them and state that it has not relied thereon, giving the reasons for
such nonreliance. 153 Alaska Interstate also held that the offeror is not
required to disclose forecasts and estimates supplied by the target if they
are not designed for public dissemination and do not show a significant
reversal of trend from that reflected in publicly available information. 1 4
Several other interesting disclosure holdings in the takeover con-
text have appeared since the beginning of 1975. Commonwealth Oil
Refining Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp.155 held that the disclosure of
potential material losses resulting from a change in control following a
tender must include the dollar amounts of such losses to the extent they
are determinable by the offeror. The fact that a tender offer for less
than all of the shares of the target may result in such losses, through the
loss of a license or other right, however, is not a per se violation of the
Williams Act.156
In the area of financing, one district court held that if the acquiring
company has made substantial working capital borrowings, even though
not earmarked for the tender offer, the borrowings should be disclosed
as related to the acquisition of the shares of the target.1 5T The purpose
of the disclosure requirement with respect to the source of funds for
151. 362 F. Supp. 939, 948-49 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973).
152. 403 F. Supp. at 598-600. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc.,
375 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
844 (1974), where the court held two years of information, in summary form, as to
sales, net income, assets, net current assets and net worth to be sufficient.
153. 402 F. Supp. at 572.
154. Id. at 568.
155. 394 F. Supp. 267, 277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
156. See id. See also Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 816
(3d Cir. 1973); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex.
1973). Commonwealth Oil did not consider the question under state corporation or
common law.
157. Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See note 137
supra and accompanying text. For an excellent discussion of interesting questionq
arising under the margin rules in connection with a tender offer situation, see Alaska
Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. at 558-65.
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the offer, however, is to provide shareholders with the ability to deter-
mine whether the offeror can pay the purchase price. Accordingly, it is
not necessary, in a situation where the offeror is to pledge the stock of
the target as security for the tender offer loan, to disclose that the in-
ability to refinance the loan could result in a change in control of the
target.'5 8 An offeror who has good faith rational support for such a
statement may state in its offer that it anticipates that cash flow will be
sufficient to service a loan and does not have to disclose the cash flow
projection providing the basis for such a statement.139 Emhart v. USM
Corp. 6o held the statements of a target company characterizing a tender
offer as "quite inadequate" and as an attempt to obtain control at
"bargain basement" prices to be misleading. The court found the state-
ments failed to set forth that the target's stock had not recently traded
above the offer price and that the target had negotiated with the offeror
for an acquisition of the target at less than ten percent above the offer
price within the preceding six months.
Tactics and Procedural Matters.-The courts generally have not been
sympathetic to assertions that procedural craftiness violates the Williams
Act. In Commonwealth Oil, the court held that a "secret" and then
"sudden" offer was not a violation, even though it was open for only a
short period and was obviously disadvantageous to the target.1 31 "Cor-
nering" all three of the leading proxy soliciting firms and thereby
further limiting the target's ability to respond was similarly not a viola-
tion.162 Finally, the Commonwealth Oil court held that notifying the
New York Stock Exchange of the impending offer, which resulted in a
trading suspension which froze the price, was not prohibited by the
Williams Act.16 3
Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co.1 4 is the first case under
section 14(e) of the Williams Act ordering a target in a hostile tender
offer to furnish the offeror with a shareholder list. While Mesa Petro-
leum held that the refusal by the target to supply the offeror with such
158. Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. at 578-79.
159. Id. at 546.
160. CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. i 95,334 (D. Mass. 1975).
161. 394 F. Supp. at 274-75 & n.I.
162. Id. at 280.
163. Id. In addition to freezing the price, a trading halt has ihe salutary effect
of preventing those who have knowledge of the impending offer from taking ad-
vantage of that knowledge before announcement of the offer. See SEC v. Sorg Printing
Co., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. c 94.767 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug.
21, 1974), in which the SEC charged a financial printing firm and seceral of its em-
ployees with violations of rule IOb-5 in purchasing shares of the target with knowledge
of the impending offer resulting from the printing work done by the firm.
164. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. r 95,424 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9.
1976).
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a list was not a violation, the court ordered the target, which was mail-
ing its own communications to shareholders, to provide the offeror with
a list, finding this the best way of informing the target's shareholders of
the positions of the offeror and the target's management. 105
While it is clear that for purposes of the Williams Act the term
"tender offer" encompasses more than the conventional tender,1 00 the
Western District of Pennsylvania in its Copperweld decision1 07 joined
the courts rejecting the theory that preconventional tender open-market
purchases, without more, constitute a tender offer.108 Thus, Copperweld
rejected the argument that pre-tender open-market purchases of an ag-
gregate of over f ur percent of the target's stock during a three-month
period ending miore than sixty days prior to the tender constituted a
tender offer, even when the offeror intended subsequently to make a
conventional tender offer.' 0 9
The Williams Act requires minimum time periods for withdrawal
of tendered shares (seven days) and proration (ten days) measured from
the date the offer is first published, sent, or given to security holders.17 0
The Copperweld court held that in computing the minimum time
periods the date of publication is not discounted.17 Thus, withdrawal
rights with respect to an offer published on the first of the month exist
through the seventh.172
165. Id. at 99, 160-61. In Crane Co. v. Anaconda Co., BNA Sec. Reg. and L. Rep.
(N.Y. Feb. 19, 1976), the New York Court of Appeals granted the offcror access to the
target's shareholder list, holding that communicating an offer to the target's share-
holders is a proper purpose within N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1315 (McKinney 1963).
166. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8392, (Aug. 30, 1968) (including
special bids as tender offers). See Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears, 3,13 F. Supp.
1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (active and widespread telephone, mail, and personal solicita-
tions constitute tender offer); Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 94,799 (N.D. 111. 1974). See generally Note, The
Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250 (1973). In one interesting case, Loews Corp. v. Accident & Cas.
Ins. Co., No. 74 C 1396 (N.D. I11.) (bench opinion, July 11, 1974), the court held that
open market purchases coupled with a publicized intent to acquire a specified per-
centage of the subject company's shares constituted a tender offer within the Williams
Act. Cf. Leighton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
167. 403 F. Stipp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
168. See, e.g., D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. fr 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); General Host
Corp. v. Triumph Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Water & Wall Associates
v. American Consumer Indus., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,913
(D.N.J. 1973).
169. 403 F. Supp. at 597-98.
170. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(5), (6) (1970).
171. 403 F. Supp. at 596-97.
172. But sec Peterscn v. Federated Dcv. Co., [Currenq CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
95,620 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1976), which held that a Dow Jones "broad tape" an-
nouncement started the ten-day pcriod running and that the date of the announce.
ment was excluded from period computation.
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Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co.173 held that a
ten-day offer communicated by mailing to a year-old stockholder list
and publication of notices (commonly called "tombstones") in a news-
paper published in the city where the target's principal office was
located and in the Eastern and Midwestern editions of The Wall Street
Journal was not sufficient to start the time periods running.1 4 The
opinion contains an implication that were the offer to be open for a
longer period, a different result might have been reached.1-- Common-
wealth Oil declined to hold that a material disclosure amendment of
the offer automatically requires that a new seven-day withdrawal period
be afforded.170 Rather, the court as a matter of discretion imposed such
a requirement.' 7
The question whether management acting in concert to defeat a
tender offer constitutes a "group" and is thus required to file a schedule
13D was presented in Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman.178 The court con-
cluded that section 13(d) was applicable, and a schedule 13D was re-
quired to be filed by "management groups, especially management
groups including non-management members."'1 9 The court distinguished
Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons,180 on the ground that the Corenco
management group did not include outsiders but consisted only of man-
agement personnel. In addition, the court pointed out that Corenco
does not mean that management groups are never required to file a
schedule 13D, but instead that where an actual tender offer is involved
and a management which is opposing it has complied with section
173. No. 75-1027C(A) (E.D. Mo., Nov. 26, 1975).
174. Id. at 13-14. In Advanced Systems, Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 79,534 (SEC 1973), the SEC staff took the position that it was not unfair
to shareholders located in areas other than the midwest when an article concerning the
tender offer was published in all editions of the Wall Street Journal and a copy of
the tender offer was published in the Chicago Tribune.
175. No. 75-1027C(A) at 14.
176. 394 F. Supp. at 282, 284-85.
177. See note 192 infra and accompanying text.
178. 397 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Twin Fair, Inc. v. Rcger. [1975-76
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 9 202 (W.D.N.Y. 1975), the court fol-
lowed GAF v. Millstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972)
in holding that an agreement to act in concert by persons beneficially owning an
aggregate of more than five percent of the class of securities is. without more, suf-
ficient for the formation of a group, triggering the schedule 13D filing requirement.
In Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), the court held that
there must also be an intention to acquire additional shares for a group to be
formed. The SEC has proposed rules which would codify the GAF rule, define the
term "beneficial ownership," and provide a short form schedule 13D that would
be available to certain persons who acquire beneficial ownership in the ordinary
course of their business and not for the purpose of affecting control. SEC Scurities
Act Release No. 5,609; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11.616 (Aug. 28, 1975).
179. Id. 'at 244.
180. 362 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973).
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14(d)(4)181 of the Williams Act, management is not required to make a
separate schedule 13D filing
-8 2
Remedies.-The judicial attitude toward remedies for inadvertent
Williams Act violations, as shown by the cases since the beginning of
1975, further reflects the congressional intent that the Williams Act not
be used to prevent changes in control, but rather that investors be
alerted by appropriate disclosure to the possibility of such changes. Of
course, the cases generally follow the congressional intent that control
changes should not be accomplished through tender offers unless in-
vestors are furnished with sufficient information to enable them to make
a reasonable decision whether or not to tender. 83
The leading case in the remedy area is the Supreme Court's decision
in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.'8 4 In Rondeau the defendant, claim-
ing ignorance of the Williams Act filing requirements, filed his
schedule 13D three months after accumulating over five percent of the
issuer's stock. The schedule 13D, which was filed only after the issuer
notified defendant that his purchases raised questions under the secu-
rities laws, disclosed that the shares were originally purchased for in-
vestment and also made clear defendant's intention to acquire additional
shares for the purpose of exercising control. The schedule, while tardy,
accurately reflected the information required to be disclosed. The Court
held that an injunction prohibiting the defendant from voting or
pledging the acquired shares, from acquiring additional shares, and
requiring divestiture of the shares, was not the appropriate remedy since
the failure was cured by the subsequent filing and did not result in
"irreparable harm."' 85
The Court rejected the argument that the injunction was necessary
to protect the interests of stockholders who had sold their stock at pre-
disclosure prices not knowing a takeover bid was imminent, or those
who would not have invested had they known the bid was imminent.1 80
181. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1970). Rule 14(d)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-(,I) (1976),
prohibits a recommendation to accept or reject a tender offer unless the person
making it has first filed a schedule 14D. Rule 14d-(2)(f), id. § 240.14d-(2)(f), permits
management to respond to a surprise offer before filing a schedule 14D if manage-
ment does no more than state it is studying the offer and request that security
holders defer decision until management makes its recommendation. See Anaconla
Co. -.. Crane Co., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. If 95,364 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
182. 397 F. Supp. at 243-44.
183. See note 124 supra.
184. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
185. Id. at 58-60.
186. Id. at 59. The Court stated:
The short of the matter is that none of the evils to which the Williams Act
was directed has occurred or is threatened in this case. Petitioner has not at-
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Noting that it was questionable whether this type of "harm" is re-
dressable under the Williams Act, the Court stated that, in any event,
persons who sold at the predisclosure prices would have an adequate
remedy through a damage action and that persons who invested without
knowledge of an impending takeover bid are not likely to be damnaged. 18
The court also rejected arguments that the public interest requires an
injunction be granted in favor of the issuer because it is in the best
position to insure compliance with the Williams Act by purchasers of
its stock.'
8 8
In Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp.,SO the Ninth Circuit interpreted
Rondeau as requiring that injunctive relief not issue under the Williams
Act unless the conduct complained of results in harm to the offerces as
distinguished from the offeror.190 Accordingly, the Court refused to
enjoin the voting of shares of the target held by the target's subsidiary,
even though the target had reported such shares as target-company-
owned (which would have made them nonvotable), and the offeror had
relied to his detriment on such report in determining the number of
shares to purchase in order to secure control of the target. Using the
same rationale, the court also refused to enjoin the voting of shares
which were transferred by the target to an employee stock ownership
plan and shares which were used by the target to acquire other com-
panies, all for the purpose of increasing the number of and disbursing
the outstanding shares in order to thwart the offeror's attempt to
acquire control.' 9 '
tempted to obtain control of respondent, either by a cash tender offer or any
other device. Moreover, he has now filed a proper Schcdule 13D, and there has
been no suggestion that he will fail to comply with the Act's rquiremenh of
reporting any material changes in the information contained therein
Id. at 59-60.
187. Id. at 60.
188. Id. at 62-63. See also Stecher-Traung-Schmidt Corp. v. Self, 529 F.2d 567 2d
Cir. 1976).
In Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1976).
the court stated that if pre-formal tender offer purchases were deeined tender offers
in violation of the Williams Act, sharelolders who sold before the tender offer hawe
an adequate remedy of damages, and the target is therefore not entitled to injunctivc
relief. Id. at 399.
189. 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
190. Id. at 232.
191. Id. But see Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. fJ 95,364 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), which indicates that an acquisition by a target
designed solely to create an antitrust block to an exchange offer may be a iolation
of § 14(e). See also Grossman, Faber & Miller P.A. v. Cable Funding Corp., [1974-75
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 94,913 (D. Del. 1974). which held that a
target company management which engages in conduct to defeat one tender offer and
ensure the success of another for personal reasons rather than tLe best interests of
the target and its shareholders may violate rule lOb-5. The complain in SEC .
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The courts have generally continued to follow the view, which
would now appear mandated by Rondeau, of permitting the offer to go
forward once appropriate corrective disclosures have been made. As a
corollary, however, the courts also require that shareholders who have
tendered before the corrective disclosures be given the opportunity to
withdraw tendered shares in view of the new disclosures.1 92 In Otis
Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp.,93 however, in view of the
confusion caused by three prior unilateral amendments of the tender
offer and doubts as to whether such amendments re-started the seven-
day withdrawal period, the existing offer, which contained disclosure
violations, was enjoined. The court left the offeror free to initiate a new
offer.'0 4 The Otis Elevator injunction, as opposed to the amendment
and extension of the withdrawal right concept employed in other cases,
may create a practical problem for the offeror since it involves the return
of previously tendered shares and may give the target additional time to
muster its defenses.' 9 5
In the most recent round of the litigation involving the fight for
control of Piper Aircraft Corporation, the Second Circuit, in Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 90 held that the damages to be
awarded to the defeated contender for control of a target, where the
competing corporation gained control through Williams Act violations,
is the difference between the price paid by the defeated contender for
its target company stock and the price it could have obtained through
sale of such stock through a public offering after the competing corpora-
tion unlawfully gained control. 10 7 Certiorari has been granted 98 and in
addition to the question of the measure of damages, among the issues
raised are whether a defeated offeror in a takeover contest has an implied
right of action for damages under section 14(e). The imminent Supreme
Thermal Power Co., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fr 95,265 (D.D.C.
1975), alleged that the target, a prospective merger partner, and the respective
presidents of each violated the antifraud rules by failing to disclose that the main
purpose of their agreement to sell a block of stock to the merger partner was to
defeat a competing cash tender offer for the target.
192. See, e.g., Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 39-1 F.
Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, 362 F. Snpp. 939
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev.
Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
193. 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
194. Id. at 974.
195. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Snpp. at
274-75 n.1, and Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. at 252-53, indicate tlat it
may be appropriate for management to attempt to delay completion of a tender offer
in order to gain time to negotiate a defensive merger.
196. 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1505 (1976) (No. 75-353).
197. Id. at 190.
198. 96 S. Ct. 1505 (1976) (No. 75-353).
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Court decision in Chris-Craft promises to be a landmark opinion on at
least some of the major issues under the Williams Act.
IV
GOING PRIVATE
The "going private"'199 phenomenon has recently received sub-
stantial attention from the federal courts. The most dramatic decisions
were those of the Second Circuit in February, 1976 in Marshel v. AFIV
Fabric Corp.200 and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc.201 Prior to these
decisions, it was generally thought, with limited deviation in the case
law, 202 that the question of whether a corporate transaction was fair did
not present a federally cognizable question, but that the only appro-
priate question under federal securities laws concerning going private
transactions was whether full disclosure had been made.2 03 In addition
to provoking Marshel, Green, and numerous other court decisions, the
going private trend has received significant federal regulatory attention,
and the SEC has proposed rules to deal with going private transactions.2 04
The Marshel Case.-Marshel, an action to enjoin the conversion of
Concord Fabrics, Inc., into a privately held company, presented an un-
appealing set of facts to a court applying equitable principles. Concord
made its initial public offering at $15 per share, and shortly thereafter its
insiders sold shares to the public at $20 per share. Several years later,
with Concord stock selling at $1 per share, Concord's insiders decided
to eliminate public ownership by causing Concord to pay the minority
$3 per share. The device to be employed to eliminate the minority
ownership was a cash merger of Concord with a new corporation owned
by the insiders and formed solely for the purpose of the merger. 05
199. "Going private" is the term employed to describe transactions which eliminate
the public ownership of a corporation while leaving the insiders or dominant parent
as the surviving equity holders.
200. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated and remandtde for mootness determina-
tion, 45 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1976).
201. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1976) (No. 75-1753).
202. See, e.g., IIT v. \Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Drachman v.
Harvey, 455 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc): Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook. 405 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
203. See, e.g., Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972); Broder v. Dane, 384
F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Dreier v. Music Makers Group, Inc.. [1973-74 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,406 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Kaufman v. Lawaence,. 3$6
F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Levine v. Biddle Sawer Corp.. 383 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974). See note 210 infra
and accompanying text.
204. See notes 236-41 infra and accompanying text.
205. 533 F.2d at 1279-80.
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The transaction was structured and administered from its inception
by the insiders, who would have owned the entire equity interest in
Concord upon a successful consummation of it. The investment banker
whose opinion was the basis for the take-out price was of dubious in-
dependence. 206 The take-out price was substantially less than the book
value per share and the price at which shares were offered to the public
a few years earlier. The transaction was to be financed with Concord's
own assets. 2 07 No opportunity for any participation in setting the terms
of the transaction was afforded to the minority shareholders, either di-
rectly or through a representative. In view of the number of Concord
shares owned by the insiders, the transaction would have been approved
by the requisite statutory vote irrespective of how the minority voted.2 08
There was admittedly no purpose for the transaction other than to
eliminate the public's ownership of Concord.
20 9
The district court in Marshel, holding that the fairness of a transac-
tion did not raise a federal question since full and complete disclosure
had been made, stated:
Plaintiffs' claims that there has been a Rule lOb-5 violation be-
cause of the unfair and inadequate price to be paid for the Con-
cord shares and the absence of a bona fide corporate purpose for
the merger are patently without merit. Rule lOb-5 simply does not
encompass these alleged wrongs.21 0
The Second Circuit, in reversing the district court's holding with
respect to rule lOb-5, responded:
What this purported "merger" amounts to is a scheme by the
[insiders], having previously taken advantage of public financing,
to appropriate for their personal benefit the entire stock ownership
of Concord at a price determined by them and paid out of the
corporate treasury .... We hold that when controlling stockholders
and directors of a publicly-held corporation cause it . . .to force
elimination of minority stockholders' equity participation for reasons
206. See People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 121, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550,
551 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (lst Dcp't 1975), another
action to enjoin the merger brought by the state attorney general, discussed in note
211 infra.
207. Id.
208. For the impact of this fact with regard to materiality and causation under
rule 1Ob-5, see Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
209. 533 F.2d at 1279.
210. 398 F. Supp. 734, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976).
vacated and remanded for mootness determination, 45 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Oct. 6.
1976).
Imaged with the Pemission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
HeinOnline  -- 1976 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 472 1976
SECURITIES REGULATION
not benefiting the corporation but rather serving only the interests
of the controlling stockholders such conduct will be enjoined
pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 .... 211
The Second Circuit rejected the argument of the Concord insiders
that the absence of any corporate purpose was irrelevant since the
proposed merger would comply in all respects with the merger sections
of the New York Business Corporation Law.2 2  Under that law, ap-
praisal rights are the exclusive remedy provided for dissenting share-
holders.21 3 The court held that the existence of the state appraisal reme-
dy did not negate the plaintiffs' rights under federal law.21 4
The Green Case.-Only a few days after Marshel, the Second Circuit,
in Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 215 held that a typical short-form
cash merger unaccompanied by a "justifiable corporate purpose" and
211. 533 F.2d at 1280-81. For the text of rule lOb-5, see note 53 supra.
The Second Circuit's obvious distaste for the Concord going piate plan uas
shared by a New York Supreme Court and the New York Attorney General. Less than
two weeks prior to the federal district court decision in Marshel, the state Suprene
Court, in People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.).
aff'd, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (lst Dep't 1975), granted ihe Nc%% York
Attorney General, in an action under the Martin Act (the New York "'Blue Sky La%%*.
a temporary injunction to prevent Concord from going private. The court did not
reach any substantive issues, finding that -[t]he sole issue . . . is whether Ehe State
has an interest in investigating and seeking to have vitiated a proposed merger or
freeze out of minority stockholders. ... Id. at 122, 371 N.Y.22d at 552. The court.
however, did not refrain from reflecting its attitude toward the transaction:
What is disquietingly evident here is the fact that a group of insiders uho are
directing the reacquisition program, even controlling the appraisal of Ehe stock,
are the very ones who made the company public oiginall%. and uill be [he
surviving shareholders in the proposed privately-held enterprise. Adding to the
odium of the scheme is the fact that no real corporate purpose has been dein-
onstrated and that the credit of a now public corporation will be used to finance
a merger for the benefit of a private group.
Id. at 125, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
212. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 901 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1975).
213. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 998, 115 N.Y.S.2d
52 (Sup. Ct. 1952). The New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed this proposition im-
plicitly in Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37 N.Y.2d 585, 333 N.E.2d 614, 376
N.Y.S.2d 103 (1975).
214. 533 F.2d at 1281. See also sccral post-1974 state cases precenting going pli-
vate mergers: Berkowitz v. Power/Mate CAorp.. 135 N.J. Super. 36. 342 A-.d 566 (Ch.
Div. 1975), and Jutkowitz v. Bourns, No. CA 000268 (Cal. Super. Ct., Uos A\ngles Co.,
Nov. 19, 1975). Both cases involved going pricate mnergers similar to that in'olhcd in
Marshel. Berkowitz, in enjoining the going priate merger. rejected the argtument
that since a damage remedy was axailable to the miorit. injuncthe relief was un-
warranted. 135 N.J. Super. at 50, 342 .2d at 574. Jutkowit: prcuented a going plixate
merger and in effect held that, notwithstanding the adequac% of Ehe take-ouL price,
a shareholder has the right to retain his shares. No. CA 000268 at 4.
215. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976). cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. OcL 4,
1976) (No. 75-1753).
Imaged with the Pemission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
HeinOnline  -- 1976 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 473 1976
1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
at an inadequate price constituted a per se violation of rule lOb-5. The
plaintiffs in Green had been minority shareholders of a Delaware
corporation, ninety-five percent of the capital stock of which had been
owned by a wholly-owned subsidiary of Santa Fe. A new corporation was
organized and the ninety-five percent interest was transferred to it. The
new corporation was then merged into the Delaware corporation with
the minority shareholders to receive $150 cash per share (based upon
the opinion of an independent investment banker) or seek their state
law appraisal rights. As required by Delaware law, the minority share.
holders received a notice advising them of the consummation of the
merger, their rights thereunder, and other detailed financial informa-
tion.
216
Plaintiffs in Green asserted that the merger constituted a manipula-
tive and deceptive device within the meaning of rule lOb-5 because (a)
the take-out price was inadequate (based in part upon information in
the notice that the appraisal value of each of their shares was in excess
of $700), (b) the merger had no corporate purpose other than forcibly
to eliminate the minority equity interest, and (c) the failure to disclose
the merger prior to its consummation deprived them of their opportunity
to obtain injunctive relief. The Second Circuit agreed with plaintiffs
and again overruled the lower court's holding that a cause of action
under the rule required misrepresentation or lack of disclosure:
Whether full disclosure has been made is not the crucial inquiry
since it is the merger and .the undervaluation which constitute the
fraud, and not whether or not the majority determines to lay bare
their real motives. If there is no valid corporate purpose for the
merger, then even the most brazen disclosure of that fact to the
minority shareholders in no way mitigates the fraudulent con-
duct.
2 17
The Green holding is particularly significant. Unlike Marshel,
which presented an egregious set of facts-insiders taking a company
public at a high price and private at a low price-Green involved a
situation for which the short-form merger statutes were specifically
216. Id. at 1287-88.
217. Id. at 1292. The fact that Delaware law provided for no notice also played
a part in the court's holding:
[W]e do not now hold that an allegation of substantial undcrvaluation, standing
alone, makes out a Rule lOb-5 case in a Delaware short-form merger setting. WC
deal here with the additional elements of lack of a justifiable corporate purpose
for the merger and the fact that the Delaware law provides for no prior notice
to the minority shareholders thus depriving them of the opportunity to apply for
injunctive relief, as well as the allegations of undervaluation.
Id. at 1292.
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designed.21s As pointed out by Judge Moore in an acrimonious and
well-reasoned dissent,2 19 the holding in Green seems to be an unwar-
ranted intrusion of federal law into an area which has historically been
thought to be the domain of state corporate law-the regulation of ie
internal affairs of corporations.
2 2 0
Subsequent to Marshel and Green.-In Merrit v. Libby, McNeill &
Libby,22 ' the Second Circuit shed further light on the scope of its hold-
ings in Marshel and Green. Merrit involved a motion for a preliminary
injunction to prevent a short-form cash merger of a ninety-two percent-
owned subsidiary. The merger had been announced by the parent
corporation in a prior tender offer for the subsidiary and in a prior
notice to shareholders under state law."22 The Merrit court, in declining
to reverse the denial of a preliminary injunction, distinguished Marshel
on the grounds that in Marshel there was no business purpose for the
merger other than elimination of the minority, corporate funds were to
be used for the freeze-out, and the insiders were attempting to take
advantage of going public at a high price and private at a low price.2
The court distinguished Green on the ground that it involved a motion
to dismiss the complaint and was therefore presumably based on the
allegation that the short-form merger there involved was unfairly priced
and without any business purpose..
2 2 4
In Nash v. Farmers New World Lie 2 2 5 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio refused to hold a short-form
merger to be a violation of rule lOb-5. The court found that (1) the
take-out price was fair, (2) the purpose of the merger was not solely to
eliminate the minority, (3) the merger was approved by more than
seventy-five percent of the minority (although the minority did not have
the power to determine the merger), (4) there was no sequence of going
public high and private low as in Marshel, and (5) the shareholders had
prior notice of the merger.
2 2
G
218. See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus.. Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del.
Ch. 1971); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7. 187 A.2d 78 (1962); E.
Folk, The Delaware General Corporation Law: A Commentary and Analysis 352 (1972);
Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 Harv. L.
Rev. 1189, 1200 (1964).
219. 533 F.2d at 1307.
220. Green was followed by Box v. Northrop Corp., 74 Civ. 4373 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
26, 1976), which denied a motion to dismiss a rule lOb.5 claim in connection with a
short-form merger. See also notes 234-35 infra and accompanying text.
221. 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976).
222. Id. at 1311.
223. Id. at 1312-13.
224. Id. at 1312.
225. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. v 95,519 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
30, 1976).
226. Id. at 99,660-61.
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In Marsh v. Armada Corp.,2 2 7 decided approximately two months
after larshel and Green, the Sixth Circuit rendered its view of the
Second Circuit opinions. Marsh involved a tender offer acquisition of in
excess of fifty percent of the target's stock, with the offer stating that if
control were acquired, the target's dividend would be eliminated and
the offeror would seek to acquire the remaining public interest in the
target through a merger.228 The plaintiffs asserted that the omission of
the dividend was a breach of fiduciary duty and constituted a fraudulent
scheme to reduce the price of the target's stock so the merger could be
effected at a reduced price. Accordingly, the essence of the plaintiff's
claims was the fairness of the merger terms.
The Sixth Circuit distinguished ilarshel and Green on the ground
that in those cases the merger itself was attacked as a fraudulent scheme,
and instead relied on the Second Circuit's opinion in Pophin v. Bishop
22 9
where only the fairness of the merger was attacked.2 3 0 The Sixth Circuit
concluded that "when the shareholders allege that the terms of a merger
are not only unfair but fraudulent but do not challenge the pturpose of
a merger they must allege deception as required by Popkin" in order to
sustain a rule lOb-5 claim.2 ' Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit declined
to equate breach of fiduciary duty with fraud:
227. 533 F,2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3011 (U.S.
July 6, 1976) (No. 76-5).
228. Id. at 980.
229. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
230. See also Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976), in
which the court rejected the argument that a tender offer by a parent company for
its 53.5% owned subsidiary, which offer stated that if widely accepted the liquidity
of the subsidiary's stock would be adversely affected, was coercive and therefore the
equivalent of a cash merger entitling the minority to appraisal rights under Delaivare
law.
In Bertozzi v. King Louie Int'l., Civ. No. 76-0158 (D.R.I. May 3, 1976), tie court
enjoined a going private tender offer on the basis that Marshel and Green established
that the coercive tender offer theory is inherent in rule 10b.5, while in Raffa v.
Mechanics Bldg. Mat. Co., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 95,535
(E.D.N.Y. April 28, 1976) the opposite result was reached. Compare Kaufman v.
Lawrence, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975), discussed in note 231 infra.
231. 533 F.2d at 986. Cases finding a valid corporate purpose for elimination of
the minority include Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393
(N.D. Fla. 1974); Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc.,
383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976); and Schllwolf v. Cerro Corp., 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup.
Ct. 1976). These three cases each involved a combination of operating companies and
not merely "form only" mergers of the type involved in Marshel. Both Universal
Food and Cerro, which were state law cases decided after Marshel and Green, ic-
fused to enjoin mergers following tender offer acquisitions. III both cases, tile merger
prices were based oin opinions of prominent independent investment bankers. Uni.
versal Food distinguished Marshel oi sc ,cral grounds, among them a valid corporate
purpose and the absence of a going public and prihate high-low sequence. Green
was distinguished on the ground that Green, in considering a motion to distmiss. a%-
sumed inadequacy of price and lack of business purpose, and that in Green there
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Although fraud by directors usually is also a breach of fiduciary
duty, a breach of fiduciary duty in formulating the terms of a
merger does not itself raise a Rule 10b-5 claim; to hold otherwise is
to provide a federal forum for all shareholders dissatisfied with the
terms of a proposed merger, which is not the intent of § 10(b) of
the Exchange Act.
2 32
The strength of the Marshel and Green holdings is questionable in
view of the Supreme Court's obvious predilection for not expanding the
scope of the federal securities laws. 2 3  In addition, the Supreme Court's
recent opinion in Cort v. Ash,2 3 4 a nonfederal securities case, may
portend the Court's reluctance to entertain suits to vindicate what may
be viewed as state law fiduciary obligations, brought in the guise of
federal claims. The Court stated:
Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their
funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors
with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal af-
fairs of a corporation.
2 3 5
Proposed Rule 13e-3.-The SEC has proposed rules on going private
transactions.2 3 6 Proposed rules 1Be-3A and 13e-3B would in effect imple-
ment the holdings in Green and Alarshel by requiring "fairness" to
shareholders as well as substantive disclosures. The SEC's proposal con-
tains two alternative rules. Implicitly in the first proposal and explicitly
in the second, if the going private transaction is not fair it will be
deemed a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice.
was no prior notice of the merger so that the minority had no opportunity to seek
injunctive relief. The Universal Food court rejected the per se proscription of "freeze
outs" adopted in Jutkowitz v. Bourns, CA 000268 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angels Co..
Nov. 19, 1975) (discussed in note 214 supra), and in effect found that state law ap-
praisal rights should be supplemented with consideration of injuncti~e relief onlN
if there is no business purpose for the -freeze out," The Cerio court also found it
significant that in addition to a %alid purpose, the terms of the merger were ap-
proved by a committee of independent directors and minority shareholders and
that the acquiring parent had agreed to vote its shares for approsal only if a majoritN
of the publicly-held shares so voted. See also Kaufman v. Lawrence. 514 F.2d 283 (2d
Cir. 1975), in which the Second Circuit, in a per curiam affirmance, upheld the
district court's refusal to enjoin a company's exchange offer for its own stock. the
stated aim of which was to eliminate public ownership. The district court noted that
there did not appear to be a large number of shareholders opposed to the offer, and
that '[i]f such opposition does exist, defendant's plans to go 'private" will be frustrated
by a sizeable number of shareholders refusing to tender their shares.- 386 F. Supp.
12, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
232. 533 F.2d at 984.
233. See notes 53-100 supra and accompanying text.
234. 422 US. 66 (1975).
235. Id. at 84.
236. Securities Act Release No. 5567 (Feb. 6, 1975).
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The first proposal would require that the consideration paid to tile
minority shareholders be no less than that jointly recommended by at
least two qualified independent appraisers. The second alternative pro-
posal would require the issuer to have a valid business purpose for the
transaction and would create a general fairness requirement. Transac-
tions covered by the proposed rule include the conventional mechanisms
of forcibly taking out minority interests in whole or in part, as well as
transactions which would have the effect of causing the securities of a
listed corporation to be delisted, terminating the registration of the
issuer under section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1 93 4,211 or
suspending the reporting obligations of the issuer under section 15(d)
of the 1934 Act.238 In addition, one of the alternative proposals would
also include as a subject transaction any transaction by the issuer or its
affiliate which would reduce by twenty-five percent or more the amount
of any class of equity security outstanding.
-aO
Under both the alternative proposals the issuer would be required
at least twenty days prior to any covered transaction to send to its share-
holders a notice containing detailed information, which would also have
to be filed with the SEC.2 40 The proposals also contain requirements
relating to withdrawal rights and proration in tender offers. In addition,
the proposals in certain instances require the issuer to notify the remain-
ing shareholders of the result and effect of the transaction, and to offer





In the third section 16(b) 242 case decided by the Supreme Court
within the last four years, the Court, in Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
238. Id. § 78m.
239. The logical justification for inclusion of these transactions within the ambit
of the proposed rule is presumably that in certain circumstances the destruction of
the liquidity of the market for the shares being repurchased may constitute a breach
of a fiduciary duty by the insiders to the nontendcring shareholders, or may constitute
a breach of an implied warranty by the issuer made at the time it went public. See
Jones %'. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969);
United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prod., Inc., [1961-64 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Scc. L.
Rep. f 91,288 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City, Md. 1963); First of Michigan Corp., [1973
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. [ 79,401 (SEC Mar. 29, 1973); House of Adler,
Inc., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. r 78,515 (SEC Sept. 30, 1971),
240. Securities Act Release No. 5567 (Feb. 6, 1975).
241. Id.
242. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1970). Corporate insiders, whose trading is regulated by § 16(b), are defined in § 16(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970), as
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Provident Securities Co.,2 43 again declined to impose section 16(b)
liability in a situation where the transaction easily could have been held
within the reach of the statute. Foremost-.McKesson arose out of the sale
by Provident Securities Company (Provident) of approximately two-
thirds of its assets to Foremost-McKesson, Inc. (Foremost), in exchange
for cash and convertible debentures of Foremost. The debentures were
convertible into more than ten percent of Foremost's outstanding com-
mon stock and were resold within two weeks after their receipt. In view
of its ten percent equivalent holdings2-4 4 and the purchase and sale
within six months, Provident sought a declaratory judgment that it was
not liable to Foremost for the profit made on the sale. Foremost counter-
claimed to recover the short swing profit.
The Court held that the purchase by whid Provident acquired its
ten percent interest could not be matched against the subsequent sale
for the purpose of imposing section 16(b) liability. The decision was
based on a construction of the last sentence of section 16(b), which
exempts from the statute's application transactions in which the ten
percent holder "was not such both at the time of the purchase and
sale, or the sale and purchase." The Court held that in a purchase-sale
sequence the exemptive provision's phrase "at the time of the purchase"
should be read as meaning "before the purchase."2 4 This conclusion was
reached primarily from an analysis of the statute's admittedly sparse
legislative history, where, from the evolution of section 16(b) through its
various proposed versions in the Congress, the Court found persuasive
evidence for its construction.2
46
Significantly, and in language that clearly reflects the Court's at-
[e]very person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
per centum of any class of any equity security . . . which is registered pursuant
to Section 78(1) of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of
such security ....
Section 16(b) provides in part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer . . . within
any period of less than six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer .... This sub-section shall not be construed to cover any transaction where
such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale. or
the sale and purchase, of the security involved ....
243. 423 U.S. 232 (1976). The other two cases are Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973) and Reliance Elec. Co. i. Emerson
Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
244. Rule 16a-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(b) (1975), includs within beneficial
ownership those securities "which such person has the right to acquire through the
exercise of presently exercisable options, warrants or rights or through the comersion
of presently convertible securities."
245. 423 U.S. at 249-50.
246. Id. at 243-51 & nn.24, 26.
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titude toward section 16(b), the Court refused to adopt an approach
which would impose section 16(b) liability simply because a challenged
transaction presents the possibility for abuse of inside information.
Rather, the opinion, while noting that ambiguities in the statute should
be resolved in favor of the construction that best serves the statute's
purpose, indicates that such purposes are not necessarily served by
resolving every ambiguity in favor of liability. Liability, according to
the Court, should only be imposed if a strict reading of the statute and
its history indicates that the transaction was of the type Congress sought
to cover:
It is inappropriate to reach the harsh result of imposing § 16(b)'s
liability without fault on the basis of unclear language. If Congress
wishes to impose such liability, we must assume it will do so ex-
pressly or by unmistakable inference .... [C]ourts should not be
quick to determine that, despite an acknowledged ambiguity, Con-
gress intended the section to cover a particular transaction.'
7
As support for its construction, the Court referred to the fact that
Congress obviously believed all short-term trading by officers and di-
rectors, without regard to the size of their holdings, was subject to
possible abuse because of the involvement such persons necessarily have
in corporate affairs. Trading by mere stockholders, the Court found,
was viewed as offering the possibility of abuse only when the holdings
were of a size that afforded the opportunity for access to inside informa-
tion. While one who becomes a ten percent holder might sell on the
basis of inside information acquired by virtue of his holdings, the Court
found that this was not a danger which Congress considered "intoler-
able" so as to warrant section 16(b)'s automatic liability, since the ptr-
chase would have been made at a time when the purchaser's holdings
were insufficient to afford the presumed access. Finally, the Court noted
that Congress had left some problems of inside information abuse to
other remedies, such as the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. 248
247. Id. at 252. Compare Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petrolelun Co., ,111
U.S. 582 (1973), which involved the conversion of shares acquired by a hostile tentler
offeror to shares of a surviving company in a defensive merger and the grant to the
surviving company of an option to purchase the conierted shales. Kern County, noting
that the insider was not an active or necessary participant in the defensive merger
and that the option was, in effect, a call, held that in the "unorthodox" factual con-
text of the case there was no possibility of speculative abuse and that neither the
conversion of shares upon the merger nor the option constituted a "sale" for § 16(b)
purposes. 411 U.S. at 596-604. Compare Kramer v. Ayer, [1975-76 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 95,483 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1976).
248. 423 U.S. at 255 & n.29.
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Approximately four years before its Foremost-McKesson decision,
the Supreme Court, in Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.,24 9
another purchase-sale sequence, considered the meaning of the phrase
"at the time of... sale" contained in the exemptive provision. There,
the Court, accepting a "split sale" device, held that a disposition of stock
by a ten percent holder which reduces the seller's interest to just less
than ten percent is a separate transaction from the later disposition of
the seller's remaining interest. Section 16(b) liability does not attach to
the later disposition because at the time of such disposition the seller
was not a ten percent holder.
- 0
The Supreme Court's Foremost-McKesson construction of the ex-
emptive provision in the last sentence of section 16(b) was carefully
limited to a purchase-sale sequence and expressly left open the question
of the proper application of the exemptive provision in the sale-repur-
chase context2 1-the situation where a ten percent holder reduces his
holdings to less than ten percent and then repurchases additional shares.
Similarly, Reliance Electric did not consider the sale-repurchase situa-
tion. In Allis-Chalmers Manufactuiing Co. v. Gulf - Western Industries,
Inc., 52 decided before the Supreme Court's Foremost-McKesson opinion,
the Seventh Circuit adopted a construction of the exemptive provision
which would make it applicable only if the ten percent holder was not a
ten percent holder immediately before the first step in either a purchase-
sale or sale-repurchase sequence.2 3 Under the Allis-Chalmers formula-
tion, a ten percent holder who reduces his ownership by sale to less than
ten percent can not repurchase within six months of such sale without
incurring section 16(b) liability for his short swing profit. While in
Foremost-McKesson the Supreme Court indicated in a footnote that
section 16(b) liability was "possible" in such a situation,2 34 it is doubt-
ful that the Court, given its decision in Reliance Electric and in view
of its requirement that the statute be read strictly before no-fault
liability can be imposed, would reach the same decision in the sale-
repurchase context as did the Allis-Chalhers court.
In Lewis v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 2 5 the Third Circuit refused to ex-
tend the rule established in Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.,2 0 that a
249. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
250. Id. at 419-20. Since Emerson Electric was not a 10,, holder before its tender
offer acquisition of 13.2% of the shares of Reliance Electric, under the holding of
Foremost-McKesson no § 16(b) liability would haw attached to eider of Enerson's
sales. See 423 U.S. at 250 n.25.
251. 423 U.S. at 242-43 & nn.15-16.
252. 527 F2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976).
253. Id. at 348 & n.13.
254. 423 U.S. at 241 n.12.
255. 513 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1975).
256. 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
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director will be liable for short swing profits even if lie was a director at
the time of only the purchase or the sale. In Lewis, the director had
resigned and did not hold office at the time of either the purchase or
the sale. Within two days after his retirement, he exercised a stock op-
tion257 and on the day of exercise sold the stock so acquired. The Third
Circuit, while recognizing the possibilities for abuse inherent in such a
situation, declined to impose liability, holding that section 16(b) applies
to a director only if he held that position at the time of the purchase or
the sale, or both.2- 8
Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co.,2- 9 decided by the Second Circuit,
involved the question whether the sale by a wife of a portion of her
separate holdings can be matched against a subsequent purchase by her
director husband for the purpose of imposing section 16(b) liability on
the husband. The Second Circuit held that if the director husband was
the "beneficial owner" of the shares sold by his spouse, liability will
attach. Moreover, exclusive control of the spouse's shares is not necessary
for a finding of beneficial ownership, which must be determined by all
of the surrounding facts. The Whiting court concluded that beneficial
ownership did exist, based on its analysis of the manner in which the
family's investments were made, the fact that income and expenses were
shared, and the lack of disclaimer of beneficial ownership in the re-
quired SEC filings.26
0
Other cases of significance, but perhaps having a narrower applica-
tion than those noted above, involved the meaning of "purchase" for
purposes of section 16(b), the timing of transactions, the valuation of
noncash consideration for purposes of computing profits, and the
medium of repayment of section 16(b) liability. Abbe v. Goss held that
the acquisition of shares pursuant to a divorce decree does not con-
stitute a purchase,2 61 and Morales v. Reading & Bates Offshore Drilling
Co. held that initiation of the paperwork to exercise an option does not
constitute a purchase since that step did not create an "irrevocable
liability to pay for the stock.'202
In addition, Morales, as well as a Second Circuit affirmance of
257. The exercise of an option is a purchase for § 16(b) purposes, with the
provisions of rule 16b(6), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b(6) (1975), operating only to limit the
amount of the recovery if options meeting the rule's requirements are involved. Sonics
Int'l, Inc. v. Johnson, 387 F. Supp. 741, 742 (N.D. Tex. 1975). See rule 16b(3), 17
C.F.R. § 240.16b(3) (1975).
258. 513 F.2d at 925.
259. 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975).
260. Id. at 688-89.
261. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ir 95,319, at 98,616 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
262. 392 F. Supp. 41, 45 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
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another lower court decision,26 3 refused to upset the twenty-year-old
rule264 that a purchase or sale followed by a sale or purchase on the last
day of a six-month period does not give rise to section 16(b) liability.
Rather, it was held that since section 16(b) requires the transactions to
take place "within" a period of "less than" six months, liability will
attach only if the transactions occur within a period starting at 12:01
A.M. on one day and ending two days prior to the day corresponding
numerically to the starting day in the sixth succeeding month. Thus, if
a purchase were made on January 1, the sale would have to be made on
or before June 29 for liability to attach. Such a "formula takes account of
'within' by excluding one day and 'less than' by excluding an additional
one day."
265
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. also held that in arriving at the
sales price for the sale component of a section 16(b) transaction, market-
able securities constituting a portion of the consideration need not be
valued at the highest price at which they traded on the day in question,
but instead could be valued on a "volume-weighted average" basis.200
In valuing a note which also constituted a portion of the consideration,
it was ruled that no discount from the face amount is permissible if the
note is in fact paid in full, notwithstanding that at the time of delivery of
the note its market value was less than face amount.2 07 Finally, LewLis v.
Arkara held that the obligation to repay a short swing profit to the





On June 4, 1975, President Ford signed the Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1975 (Act).2 9 While amending all of the statutes administered
263. Colonial Realty Corp. v. MacWilliams, 512 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir.), cert. dcnicd.
423 U.S. 867 (1975), aff'g 381 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
264. Established in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), remanded on other grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 352 U.S. 831
(1956).
265. 392 F. Supp. at 45.
266. 527 F.2d 335, 352-53 & n.19. See notes 252-54 supra and accompanying text.
267. 527 F.2d at 356-57.
268. 401 F. Supp. 449, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Where the profit realized by the
insider is taxed as a long-term capital gain, the repayment will be afforded treatment
as a long-term capital loss, not as an ordinary and necessary business expense. Brown
v. Commissioner, 529 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1976).
269. Act of June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.).
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by the SEC, the Act represents a major revision of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.270 The Act reflects a congressional determination
that competition in the securities markets should be encouraged, that
information with respect to securities transactions in all markets should
be readily available so that orders may be executed in the best market,
and that free access to the organizations operating within the securities
markets by all qualified persons is crucial to the establishment of fIrce
and open competition.27 In addition to providing the framework for
a National Market System, 272 including a national system for the clear-
ance and settlement of securities transactions, 27 3 the Act makes major
changes in the regulation of brokers and dealers, 27 4 including those
handling municipal securities.275 Further regulation of national secu-
rities exchanges27 6 and securities associations 2 "7 is combined with ex-
270. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-80 (Supp. V, 1975). Unless otherwise indicated, all section
references are to the provisions of the 1934 Act as amended by the Act.
271. See, e.g., §§ 2, 6, llA, 15, 15A, and 17A of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, 78f,
78k-1, 78o-3, 78q-1 (Supp. V, 1975). For discussion of the Act and its effects, see
Pitt, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 174 N.Y.L.J., No. 114, at I (Dec.
15, 1975); Rowen, Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 8 Rev. Sec. Reg. 889 (1975).
Section 23(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1975), requires the SEC to consider
the effect on competition of any rule adopted under the 1934 Act.
It should be noted that the Act eliminated § 15A(n) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(n) (1970), which provided that in the event of a conflict, § 15A(n) prevailed
over any other provision of law in effect at the date § 15A(n) was enacted. The section
was viewed as a limited antitrust exemption. The Senate Report accompanying S.
249, the Senate version of the Act, states that the deletion of this provision is not
designed to change existing law on the relationship between tle antitrust and
securities laws. S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1975) [hereinafter cited a
Senate Report]. See also the Report of the Senate-House Conference Committee on
the Act, H.R. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Con.
ference Report], in which the Conference Committee recognizes a potential confikit
but states that the "conferees are confident that the courts can avoid actual conflicts
by a flexible use of existing precedents." The application of the antitrust laws to
the securities industry in light of the Act and Gordon v. Ncw York Stock Exch., Inc.,
422 U.S. 659 (1975) and United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S.
694 (1975) is beyond the scope of this article. For an interesting discussion of thhi
topic, see Baker, Antitrust Law and Policy in the Securities Industry: A Tale of Two
Days in June, 31 Bus. Law. 743 (1976); Heckman, Antitrust Immunity, 8 Rev. Sec.
Reg. 841 (1975).
272. See § 11A, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (Supp. V, 1975), and text accompanying notes
287-93 infra.
273. See § 17A, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (Supp. V, 1975), and text accompanying notes
306-25 infra.
274. See §§ 15, 15B, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78o-4 (Supp. V, 1975), and text accompany.
ing notes 326-38 infra.
275. See §§ 15, 15B, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78o-4 (Supp. V, 1975), and text accompanying
notes 339-50 infra.
276. See § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (Supp. V, 1975), and text accompanying note 351
infra.
277. See § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (Supp. V, 1975), and text accompanying note
351 infra.
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pansion of the authority of the SEC to oversee their operations. -78 , The
Act resolves the issue of commission rates in favor of fully competi-
tive rates,2 7 9 specifically permitting an investment adviser to pay more
than the lowest available commission rate.2 8 0 It also resolves the issue of
institutional membership in favor of open membership2sl and the con-
flict of money management and brokerage in favor of a separation of
the two functions.282 The Act reverses Rosenfeld v. Black,28 3 expressly
permitting the sale of an investment adviser for more than book value.
284
Finally, the Act contains amendments concerning the SEC's authority
to investigate violations and to seek injunctions.
2 S5
Thus, the Act represents a massive legislative undertaking which is
already having far-reaching effects.2s 6 The following discussion sum-
marizes the highlights of this new legislation.
National Market System.-The Act does not mandate the establish-
ment of a single market. Rather, it envisions that through modern
electronic techniques, information about transactions in the various
exchange and over-the-counter markets can be disseminated in order to
permit the public to seek out the best price. The Act gives the SEC
authority to develop a national system which will accomplish these
legislative goals.2s 7 Pursuant to the new legislation, the SEC has ap-
pointed a fifteen-member National Market Advisory Board to advise it
on the development of the national market system.2 8 The Board is
authorized to conduct a feasibility study of the need for a new self-
278. See § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (Supp. V, 1975), and text accompanying notes 35--57
infra.
279. See § 6(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e) (Supp. V, 1975), and text accompan ing notes
360-63 infra.
280. See § 28(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(c) (Supp. V, 1975). and text accompan)ing notcs
364-72 infra.
281. See §§ 6(b)(2), 15A(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(2), 78o-3(b)(3) (Supp. V. 1975), and
text accompanying notes 351-52 infra.
282. See §§ 11(a), 11(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k(a), 78k(b) (Supp. V, 1975), and text ac-
companying notes 373-81 infra.
283. 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 409 U.S. 802 (1972).
284. See § 15(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. as amended by the
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f) (Supp. V, 1975), and text accompanying notes 383-86 infra.
285. See §§ 21(d), (g), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), (g) (Supp. V, 1975). and text accom-
panying notes 387-88 infra.
286. The SEC has issued several releases relating to rules and other matters
mandated by the Act. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Releases No. 11,469
(June 12, 1975); No. 11,595 (Aug. 14, 1975); No. 11,607 (Aug. 20, 1975); No. 11.734
(Oct. 15, 1975); No. 12,030 (Jan. 20, 1976); and No. 12,055 (Jan. 27, 1976). [Hereinafter,
all references to releases are to those issued under the 1934 Act, and cited as Release
No.].
287. See § IlA(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
288. See § llA(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(d) (Supp. V, 1975); Release No. 11,623
(Aug. 28, 1975).
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regulatory body to administer the national market system and is to
report its recommendations to the Congress by December 31, 1976.289
The Act gives the SEC authority to adopt rules designed to assure
"equal regulation" 290 of all markets for qualified securities and of all
exchange members, brokers, and dealers effecting transactions in such
securities. 2 01 The SEC is also given authority to facilitate the develop-
ment of a composite quotation system and a composite tape;2 92 hence-
forth all exclusive securities information processors must register with
the SEC.2
93
289. Section IIA(d)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(d)(3)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
290. Section 3(a)(36), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(36) (Supp. V, 1975), providcs:
A class of persons or markets is subject to "equal regulation" if no member of
the class has a competitive advantage over any other member thereof resulting
from a disparity in their regulation under this title which the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission determines is unfair and not necessary or appropriate ill
furtherance of the purposes of this title.
291. See §§ llA(a)(1)(C)(ii), IIA(c)(1)(F), 11(b), 15(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k(b), 78k-l(a)
(1)(C)(ii), 78k-l(c)(1)(F), 78o(c)(5) (Supp. V, 1975).
The Act also expresses congressional concern for the continued viability of small
brokers, requiring the SEC to monitor the effects of the legislation on them and to
report to Congress. See text accompanying note 391 infra.
292. See §§ I1A(c)(I)-(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k-l(c)(l)-(2) (Stipp. V, 1975).
As of January 26, 1976, the consolidated tape has been providing information as
to transactions in New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange securitie
in the exchange and over-the-counter markets. Stock tables for New York and
American Stock Exchange listed securities appearing in The New York Times and
The Wall Street Journal now report information on a consolidated basis. The con-
solidated tape closes at 5:30 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, rather than tile 4:00 p.m.
closing on the exchanges. However, all vendors of last sale information are currently
maintaining separate records so that closing quotations at 4:00 p.m. may be obtained.
For an interesting discussion of the birth pains of the consolidated tape and tile
central market, see Rustin, Composite Stock Tape and New Tables Cause Confusion
For Investors, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
The Division of Investment Management Regulation of the SEC has indicated
that investment companies may continue to price listed securities on the basis of the
close of the exchange or switch to pricing on the consolidated tape. The principles of
Accounting Series Release No. 118 (Investment Company Act No. 6295) (Dec. 23, 1970),
with respect to accounting for investment securities by registered investment com-
panies continue to apply for over-the-counter securities.
293. Sections IIA(b)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k-l(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
Section 3(a)(22), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(22) (Supp. V, 1975), defines cxclusive securities
information processor as any person engaged in the business of collecting, purchasing
or distributing information on transactions or quotations for any security on all
exclusive basis on behalf of any national securities exchange or registered securities
association or any such exchange or association which engages on an exclusive basis on
its own behalf. The SEC has adopted rule llAb2-1 under the 1934 Act providing for
the registration of exclusive securities information processors and has promulgated form
SIP for use in so registering. In addition, the SEC proposed adoption of rules llAb2-2
and IlAb2-3 on annual updating of registration and registration of a successor to a
registered processor and rule lIAb5-1 requiring a processor which limits or prohibits
access to its system to give notice to the SEC with an explanation of the reason for
any such prohibition or limitation. Since nonexclusive processors are exempt from
registration unless the SEC requires registration, it has sought comment on the need
for nonexclusive processors to register. Release No. 11673 (Sept. 23, 1975).
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One of the fears expressed during the congressional hearings on
the legislation was that it would eliminate the auction market.2-" 4 The
Act seeks to continue an auction market by means of the composite tape
and quotation mechanisms and by provisions giving the SEC authority
to prescribe rules requiring broker-dealers trading for their own account
to yield to public orders.295 Furthermore, the SEC is authorized to
eliminate, in effect, the third market by prohibiting the execution of
transactions in listed securities off the exchange where the securities are
listed. The transactions may be prohibited if the SEC finds on the
record and after opportunity for a hearing that as a result of them, the
fairness and orderliness of the market for such securities has been
adversely affected, the rules of such exchange do not unreasonably im-
pair competition among market makers, including exchange specialists,
and the maintenance or restoration of fair and orderly markets in such
securities may not be assured through other lawful means. 2 0 0 In this
connection, the Act requires the SEC to review all rules of national
securities exchanges which limit the ability of members to effect transac-
tions off such exchanges.2 97 The principal rule of this nature was New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rule 394.09 8 On December 19, 1975, the
SEC adopted rule 19c-1 under the 1934 Act, prohibiting any exchange
rules which limit the execution of agency transactions off the exchange,
except that an exchange may, until January 2, 1977, require that public
limit orders on the exchange be satisfied before a transaction is executed
off-board. The rule is inapplicable to round lot principal transactions,
the SEC reserving decision on this question.2-0 As a result, the NYSE
has rescinded rule 394 and adopted rule 390300 to satisfy the require-
ments of rule 19c-1.
3 01
The Act authorizes the SEC to permit exchanges to extend unlisted
trading privileges to certain over-the-counter securities.3 02 Reflecting a
desire to foster inter-dealer and other competition, the Act requires the
SEC, in passing upon an exchange application for such privileges, to
294. See Hearings on S. 249 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Scss. 198-99 (1975).
295. Sections 11(a)(2), 11(b), 15(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k(a)(2). 78k(b), 78o(c)(5) (Supp.
V, 1975).
296. Section l1A(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(c)(3) (Supp. V. 1975).
This is commonly known as the "failsafe" power reflecting the expectation that
it is to be used only as a last resort. See Conference Report. supra note 271, at 95.
297. Section 11A(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(c)(4) (Supp. V. 1975).
298. See 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. Guide c 2,394 (Mar. 31, 1976).
299. Release No. 11,942 (Dec. 19, 1975) (effective Mar. 31, 1976). For the adverse
reaction of Congressman Moss to the decision by the SEC to defer acting on principal
transactions, see 338 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. A-7 (1976).
300. 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. Guide , 2,390 (Mar. 31, 1976).
301. See also the new amendments to NYSE rules 395 and 396, id. cc 2.395, 2.396.
302. Section 12(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(0(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
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consider among other things, "the desirability of removing impediments
to and the progress that has been made toward the development of a
national market system. ' 303 Like its third-market provisions,O' t the Act
also prohibits the SEC from granting unlisted trading privileges if the
rules of the applicant exchange unreasonably impair competition among
market makers, including exchange specialists.3 05
National System for Clearance and Seltlement.-The Act mandates
the establishment of a national system for clearance and settlement of
securities transactions, including the transfer of record ownership.80
Accordingly, the SEC is directed, as it is directed with respect to a
national market system,3 07 to use its powers under the 1934 Act to
establish such a system.3 08 All clearing agencies must register with the
SECO09 and the SEC may not approve the registration of a clearing
agency unless it determines that the rules of the agency permit open
membership, are designed to perfect the mechanism for a national
clearing system, and do not impose an unnecessary burden on competi-
tion.310 The agency may, however, deny participation to any person
subject to a "statutory disqualification," that is, a person who has com-
mitted certain specified violations relating primarily to the securities in-
dustry, including certain criminal violations.31 1 Further, the agency may
deny participation to any person not meeting its financial, operational,
experience, and competence standards.3 12 The SEC must also find that
the agency's rules are designed to promote prompt and accurate clearance
and settlement and to perfect the mechanism of a national clearance
and settlement system.313 Finally, there must be a finding that the rules
of the agency require the appropriate disciplining of participants for
violation of its rules and provide a fair disciplinary procedure.314
303. Section 12(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
304. See text accompanying note 296 supra.
305. Section 12(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
306. Section 17A, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (Supp. V, 1975).
307. See text accompanying note 287 supra.
308. Section 17A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(a)(2) (',upp. V, 1975).
309. Section 17A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(b) (Supp. V, 1975). A cleauing agenc) is
defined generally in § 3(a)(23), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23) (Supp. V, 1975), as aly person
who acts as an intermediary in making payments or deliveries or both in connection
with securities transactions, including central securities depositories
The SEC has adopted rule 17Ab2-1 providing for the registlation of cleating
agencies and form CA-I for use in registering. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.17Ab2-1, 2,19b.200
(1976).
310. Sections 17A(b)(3), (F), (I), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78q1-(b)(3)(B), (F), (I) (Supp. V, 1975).
311. For a definition of "statutory disqualification," see § 3(a)(39), 15 U.S.C. § 78c
(a)(39) (Supp. V, 1975).
312. Section 17A(b)(4)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(b)(4)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
313. Section 17A(b)(3)(F), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(b)(3)(F) (Supp. V, 1975).
314. Section 17A(b)(3)(G)-(H), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(b)(3)(G)-(H) (Supp. V, 1975).
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The Act requires that each transfer agent register with its "appro-
priate regulatory agency. '31m The concept of appropriate regulatory
agency is a new one, designed to accommodate the fact that banks are
active in the clearing and transfer aspects of the securities industry, as
municipal securities dealers and also as institutional investment man-
agers. Depending on the bank, its appropriate regulatory agency may
be the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC).316 The appropriate regulatory agency may enforce compliance
by clearing agencies and transfer agents with rules it adopts.3 1 - While
clearing agency applications for registration are filed with the SEC, the
appropriate regulatory agencies have authority to review them and re-
quest the SEC to deny approval.3 ' s The Act contains several other
provisions relating to the interaction of the SEC with bank regulatory
authorities designed to give the bank authorities a major role in the
regulation and disciplining of clearing agencies and transfer agents as
well as bank municipal securities dealers.
3 1 9
The Act gives the SEC authority to provide for the form and format
of securities32 0 and requires specified financial institutions customarily
involved in the transaction process to report to the SEC or, in the case
of specified securities, a Federal Reserve Bank, information with respect
to missing, lost, counterfeit, or stolen securities.3 21 The Act provides that
315. Section 17A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-I(c) (Supp. V, 1975). Section 3(a)(25). 15 U-S.C.
§ 78c(a)(25) (Supp. V, 1975), defines transfer agent generall as an. person u1to en-
gages on behalf of an issuer or on its own behalf in countersigning securitis, acting
as registrar, or transferring record ownership of securities by bookkeeping e'utries.
The SEC, Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reseer~ Board and Fenderal De-
posit Insurance Corporation have adopted Form TA-I for the regibtration of trantsfer
agents. 17 C.F.R. § 249b.100 (1976). "Transfer agent" includes anv person (including
issuers who may have transfer agents) if it performs any transfer agent functions such
as recording the transfer of its securities on records maintained by it. Release No.
11,759 (Oct. 22, 1975).
316. For a definition of "appropriate regulatory agenc)," see § 3(a)(34), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(34) (Supp. V, 1975).
317. Sections 17A(d)(I)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(d)(l)-(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
318. Section 19(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. : 78s(a)(2) (Supp. V. 1975).
319. See, e.g., § 13(f)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(4); §§ 1511(c)(5)-(6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 780.
4(c)(5)-(6); §§ 17A(d)(3)-(4), 15 U.S.C. '§ 78q-l(d)(3)-(4); §§ 19(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s
(d)-(f § 21(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(f) (Supp. V, 1975).
320. Section 12(t), 15 U.S.C. § 781(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
321. Section 17(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(0)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
On January 20, 1976, the SEC proposed adoption of rule 17f-1. The rule would
require that certain persons who regularly handle securities submit to the SEC or
any federal reserve bank any information relating to lost, stolen, missing, or countcr-
feit securities. The proposal also requires that each such person make inquiry of ile
SEC or any federal reserve bank with respect to eer security coming into its poss..
sion whether the security has been reported as stolen, lost. missing, or counterfeit.
Release No. 12,030 (Jan. 20, 1976).
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the SEC shall use its authority under the Act to end the physical move-
ment of securities in connection with transaction settlements 22 and
requires the SEC to propose legislation to eliminate securities certifi-
cates. 323 State or local transfer taxes based on the location of transfer or
clearing facilities in the taxing jurisdiction are prohibited.824 Finally,
the Act directs the SEC to study the practice of recording ownership in
street name to determine if the practice is consistent with the purposes
of the 1934 Act and whether steps can be taken to facilitate communica-
tion with beneficial owners while retaining the street name practice.82 1,
Regulation of Brokers and Dealers.-The registration and dis-
ciplinary provisions of the 1934 Act and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 have been coordinated.
32 - The definition of "interstate commerce"
has been amended to include intrastate use of any facility of a national
securities exchange or of a telephone or other interstate means of com-
munication.327 As a result of this amendment and the amendment to
the registration provisions, specialists, floor traders, and two-dollar
brokers, who previously were not required to register, have been sub-
jected to the registration requirements.3 -8 Registration is no longer
automatic; the SEC must take affirmative action on an application
within forty-five days of filing and either grant the application or start
proceedings to deny.329 The Act now requires an examination of a newly
registered broker or dealer within six months of the registration to
determine whether it is operating in conformity with the provisions of
the statute. The examination is to be performed by the SEC or, if it so
delegates its authority, by the securities association or exchange of which
the broker or dealer is a member.3 30
The 1934 Act has been revised so as to give the SEC authority to
establish standards of operational capability, training, experience, and
322. Section 17A(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(e) (Supp. V, 1975).
323. Section 23(b)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(b)(4)(E) (Supp. V, 1975).
On September 15, 1975, the Committee on Stock Certificates of the Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association issued its
recommendations on the elimination of stock certificates. The report recommends all
amendment to state corporation laws to give corporations the power to issue utn.
certificated stock and an extensive revision of the Uniform Commercial Code. For a
discussion of this project, see Aronstein, A Certificatelcss Article 8? Can We Have It
Both Ways, 31 Bus. Law. 727 (1976).
324. Section 28(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(d) (Supp. V, 1975).
325. Section 12(m), 15 U.S.C. § 781(m) (Supp. V, 1975).
326. Compare §§ 15(b)(2), (4), (6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(2), ('4), (6), with the Invest.
ment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 203(c)(1), 203(c), (f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(c)(1), (e), (f)
(Supp. V, 1975).
327. Section 3(a)(17), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (Supp. V, 1975).
328. See § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
329. Section 15(a)(b)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(b)(I) (Supp. V, 1975).
330. Section 15(b)(2)(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(2)(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
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competence for brokers and dealers.33' The Act also requires every
broker to file an annual audited balance sheet and income statement
with the SEC and such other financial information as the SEC may
require. This improvement eliminates the historical "surprise" audits.
Further, every registered broker is now required by statute to supply
its customers with an annual audited balance sheet and such other in-
formation as the SEC may by rule require.3
32
The Act requires the adoption by the SEC of a uniform net capital
rule for all brokers and dealers. 333 This rule, which replaced the net
capital rules of registered securities exchanges, became effective in
1975. 3 3 4 While a detailed discussion of the new rule is be)ond the scope
of this article, it should be noted that the rule provides for an alterna-
tive net capital computation. Instead of the previous approach of limit-
ing the amount of aggregate indebtedness to net capital (generally fif-
teen to one in the new rule), the new rule substitutes for the ratio of
aggregate indebtedness to net capital the aggregate dollar amount of
firm assets which have as their source transactions with customers. The
alternative requires a broker or dealer to maintain net capital equal to
the greater of S100,000 or four percent of the aggregate adjusted debit
items computed in accordance with the Formula for Determination of
Reserve Requirements for Brokers and Dealers335 (brokers operating
under the historical formula must have as little as $2,500 of net apital
or as much as $100,000, depending on the nature of their business, the
standard amount being $25,000).3. 3 In addition, the 1934 Act now
specifically authorizes the SEC to adopt rules regulating the lending by
brokers of securities carried for the account of the customer.33-
Finally, the Act provides that every exchange member, broker,
dealer, registered transfer agent, and registered clearing agency shall,
except to the extent exempted by SEC rule, require each of its partners,
directors, officers, and employees to be fingerprinted.
338
The 1934 Act now provides for the registration of brokers and
331. Section 15(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (Supp. V, 1975).
332. Sections 17(e)(1)(A)-(B), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78q(e)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
333. Section 17(c)(1)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
334. See Release No. 11,497 (June 26, 1975). See also Release No. 11,624 (Aug. 29.
1975) which amends rule 15c3-I, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1976). to provide an altena-
tive net capital requirement for floor brokers and to treat registered options traders
as specialists. See Release No. 11,969 (Jan. 2, 1976).
335. See Exhibit A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (1976).
336. Id. § 240.15c3-1 (1976).
337. Section 8(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78(h)(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
338. Section 17(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78h(c) (Supp. V, 1975). The SEC has adopted
rule 17f-2 which exempts certain persons not engaged in the securities transaction
process from the fingerprinting requirement. The rule also defers the fingerprinting
requirement to Jan. 1, 1977. Release No. 12,214 (July 1, 1976).
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dealers in municipal securities. 3 9 Previously, persons dealing in such
securities were not required to register, but were subject to the anti-
fraud rules.3 40 The Act includes within the definition of municipal
securities dealer a separately identifiable department or division of a
bank and any bank unless it is engaged in buying and selling municipal
securities for its own account other than in a fiduciary capacity.84 1 The
SEC must affirmatively take action on a registration application in th
same manner as with an application by any other broker or dealer.8
42
The Act mandates the establishment of a fifteen-member Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board which was established by the SEC in
September of 1975.3 43 The Board is required to adopt rules with respect
to transactions in municipal securities providing at least that all munici-
pal securities brokers and dealers must meet such standards of opera-
tional capability, training, and experience and competence as the Board
finds necessary. The rules must also be designed to perfect the me-
chanism of a free and open market in municipal securities. Generally,
the rules must be consistent with the national market system which is
mandated with respect to other brokers and dealers.344 Primary en-
forcement of these rules is given to the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers, Inc. (NASD) (with respect to its members) 34 or the appro-
priate regulatory agency for the municipal securities dealer, if the NASD
339. See §§ 3(a)(12), 15a, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12), 78o(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
340. § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b.5 (1976).
For recent developments in lob-5 litigation, see notes 53-121 supra and accompanying
tex t.
341. For definitions of municipal securities dealer, municipal securities broker,
and related terms, see §§ 3(a)(29)-(33), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29).(33) (Supp. V, 1975). See
also rule 15b2B-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b2B-I (1976), with respect to registration of such
departments.
342. Sections 15(b)(1), 15B(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(1), 78o-4(a)(2) (Stipp. V, 1975).
The SEC has adopted rules 15Ba2-1 and 15Ba2-2 and form MSD undter the 1931
Act with respect to the registration of municipal securities dealers. 17 C.F.R. §§ 2,10.15
Ba2-1, .15Ba2-2 (1976). Banks or separately identifiable departments or division% of
banks which are municipal securities dealers must register with the SEC on formI MSD.
Intrastate municipal securities dealers must register on form lID. Other municipal
securities brokers and dealers must also register on form BD. The Municipal
Securities Rule-Making Board (see text accompanying note 343 infra), has :doptcd
rules defining separately identifiable department or division. The department is
separately identifiable if it conducts all of the bank's municipal activities, and if it
is under the direct supervision of an officer designated by the board of directors atnd
maintains separate records. Release No. 11,742 (Oct. 15, 1975).
343. Release No. 11,635 (Sept. 5, 1975); see § 15B(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o.4(b)(1)
(Supp. V, 1975).
344. Sections 15B(b)(1), (2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-4(b)(2)(A), (C) (Stipp. V, 1975).
The power of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board to promulgate rules
does not abrogate the power of the SEC to adopt rules in this area. See section
15B(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(3) (Supp. V, 1975).
345. Section 15A(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (Stpp. V, 1975).
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is not appropriate. 340 Ultimate authority rests with the SEC.34T Such
dealers by reason of their registering automatically become subject to
enrollment in the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.
Section 15B(d) of the 1934 Act,3 4 8 known as the "Tower Amend-
ment," specifically provides that no issuer of municipal securities shall
be required to file with the SEC or the Board prior to sale, any applica-
tion, report, or document in connection with such sale, and that the
Board may not require the issuer to furnish the Board, a purchaser, or
a prospective purchaser with any otherwise not generally available ap-
plication, report or document with respect to the issuer. The section
provides that it is not to be construed to limit or impair the authority
of the SEC under any provision of the federal securities laws. 3a 9 Since
the antifraud rules are applicable to the sale of municipal securities,
as a practical matter municipal brokers and dealers are under an obli-
gation to assure themselves that adequate disclosure is made to pro-
spective purchasers. This is normally accomplished by preparation and
distribution of an offering circular.35
0
Regulation and Oversight of National Securities Exchanges and
Securities Associations.-The provisions relating to the registration of
national securities exchanges and securities associations have been revised
to provide that the SEC shall not approve any registration unless it
finds that the rules of the applicant provide for open membership and
are designed to perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and
a national market system. As with clearing agencies, the rules of ex-
changes and associations must provide for disciplinary action in the
event of a violation of the 1934 Act. Finally, the SEC must find that the
rules do not impose any unnecessary burden on competition. Again, as
with clearing agencies, membership can be denied if the applicant is
subject to a statutory disqualification or if he does not meet the ex-
changes' or associations' standards of training, experience, and com-
petence, or has engaged in or is likely to engage in a practice inconsistent
346. Section 15B(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(5) (Supp. V. 1975).
347. See § 15B(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
348. Section 15B(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d) (Supp. V, 1975).
349. Id.
350. Senator Eagleton recently introduced a bill-S. 2574. 94th Cong., ISt Ses.
(1975)-which would require registration with the SEC of municipal securities.
Further, Senators Williams and Tower recently introduced the Muicipal Securities
Full Disclosure Act of 1976 (id., S. 2969) which would require municipalities with $50
million of securities outstanding to prepare annual reports reflecting thcir financial
condition, including audited financials commencing in 1979, which must be made
available to security holders. The bill would also require any issuer of an issue of
municipal securities sold through a broker or dealer (in excss of $5,000.000) to issue
a distribution statement containing a description of the offering and information
similar to that in the required annual report
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with just and equitable principles of trade.8 51
An exchange is permitted to limit the number of its members (in-
cluding floor members) except that an exchange cannot decrease the
number of its members below the number in effect on May 1, 1975 or
the date of the exchange's registration, if later. The SEC can also
require an exchange to increase the number of its members if the SEC
determines that the limitation imposes unnecessary burdens on com-
petition. 352 Furthermore, the Act gives the SEC authority to require a
nonmember to comply with specific rules of an exchange if he executes
transactions on the exchange without the use of another broker.83
The 1934 Act gives the SEC authority not only to review proposed
rules of self-regulatory organizations, but now provides that the SEC
shall have the power upon following a specified procedure to "abrogate,
add to, and delete from" the rules of a self-regulatory organization
(other than a registered clearing agency) as the SEC deems appropriate
and consistent with the 1934 Act.8 54 The Act provides for direct appeal
to the courts of appeals by any person aggrieved by such a rule, as well
as rules adopted by the SEC pursuant to other sections and other
specified SEC actions. 355 Further, the SEC (with respect to persons for
whom it is the appropriate regulatory agency) and the other regulatory
agencies are given the power, upon following a specified procedure, to
review disciplinary actions against members or participants85 0 The ap-
propriate regulatory agency is also given power to suspend or revoke the
registration of any self-regulatory organization and to suspend or expel
a member or participant.
5 7
The Act requires at least one public director of exchanges and
associations. The conference report, however, makes clear that this re-
quirement is not meant to repudiate the balanced boards adopted by
the NYSE and the American Stock Exchange. 358
The Act redesignates section 15(b)(7) as section 15(b)(6) and elim-
inates the SEC's authority to bring an administrative proceeding
351. See §§ 6(a), (b), (c)(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(a), (b), (c)(1)-(3) (Supp. V, 1975).
See also §§ 15A(a), (b), (g)(I)-(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, -4, -10(l)-(3) (Supp. V, 1975).
Since banks arc not included within the definition of broker or dealer, exchanges
and securities associations are not required to permit them to become mnembeis, al-
though bank subsidiaries would presumably be entitled to join. See §§ 3(a)(4).(5), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4)-(5) (Supp. V, 1975).
352. Section 6(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(4) (Supp. V, 1975).
353. Section 6(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(f) (Supp. V, 1975).
354. Sections 19(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b)-(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
355. Section 25, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (Supp. V, 1975).
356. Sections 19(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(d)-(f) (Supp. V, 1975).
357. Section 25(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(h) (Supp. V, 1975).
358. Sections 6(b)(3), 15A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(3), 78o-3(b)(4) (Supp. V, 1975).
See Conference Report, supra note 271, at 98.
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against "any person" who has committed specific violations. Such power
is now limited to actions against "an), person associated, or seeking to
become associated, with a broker or dealer." However, the SEC has
taken the position that a provision similar to former section 15(b)(7)
contained in section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 con-
tinues to give it the authority removed by section 15(b)(7). 350
Commission Rates, Paying-Up, Separation of Money Management
and Brokerage.-The Act codifies rule 19b-3 under the 1934 Act pro-
hibiting the imposition by any exchange of any schedule of fixed com-
mission rates, except that fixed intramember rates were permitted to
continue until May 1, 1976.360 The SEC may authorize the reimposition
of fixed rate schedules until November 1, 1976 if it finds that such
schedules "are in the public interest.'
361
After November 1, 1976, before the SEC permits the reimposition
of fixed rates it must find that they "(i) are reasonable in relation to
the costs of providing the service for which such fees are charged (and
the Commission [must] publish the standards employed in adjudging
reasonableness), and (ii) do not impose any burden on competition in
furtherance of the purposes of this title, taking into consideration the
competitive effects of permitting such schedule or fixed rates weighed
against the competitive effects of other lawful actions which the Com-
mission is authorized to take under this title.' 3 62 Prior to November 1,
1976, the normal rulemaking procedures are to be followed with respect
to any proposal to reimpose fixed rates. Thereafter, before permitting
the reimposition of fixed rates, the SEC must follow a more formal
procedure, although not a full hearing on the record.
303
Prior to the imposition of fully negotiated rates, investment man-
agers regularly obtained research services from brokerage firms which
also executed transactions for the managed accounts. Negotiated rates,
therefore, naturally raise the question of whether a manager must pay
the lowest available rate if he receives services in addition to basic
execution services. The 1934 Act has been amended specifically to per-
mit any person to pay more than the minimum available commission
rate if such person determines "in good faith that such amount of com-
mission was reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and
research services provided ... viewed in terms of either that particular
359. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b) (1970).
360. Section 6(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e) (Supp. V, 1975).
361. 5 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
362. Id. § 78f(e)(1)(B).
363. Id. Section 6(e)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(3), requires that until Dec. 31, 1976, the
SEC is to follow the effects that fully negotiated rates are having on the securities
industry and to report the same to Congress on a periodic basis.
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transaction or his overall responsibilities with respect to the accounts as
to which he exercises investment discretion."
'30 4
Thus, an adviser may "pay-up" for research beneficial to all of his
accounts. This section is intended to preempt common law with respect
to fiduciary responsibility as well as any federal and state statutory law
in effect prior to the Act which would have exposed a fiduciary to
liability solely for failing to pay the lowest commission cost available.8 r
Therefore, as has always been the case, a fiduciary must be prepared to
demonstrate that the quality of the services received, including the
availability and value of research, merited the expenditure for such
brokerage and ancillary services.30 6
The nature of the brokerage and research services that a fiduciary
may consider is expansive. The Senate Report specifies that the provi-
sion was "intended to comprehend the subject matter in the broadest
terms, subject to the good faith standard" of the provision, and that the
test for determining when a service is encompassed by the section is
"whether it provides lawful and appropriate assistance to the money
manager in the carrying out of his responsibilities."30 7 The services
specified in the Act include: (i) furnishing advice, either directly or
through publications or writings, as to the value of the securities, the
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities and the
availability of securities or purchasers or sellers of securities; (ii) analysis
and reports concerning issuers, industries, securities, economic factors and
trends, portfolio strategy, and the performance of accounts; and (iii) the
execution of securities transactions, including the functions which are
incidental thereto such as settlement and custodyYO3
As a result, in selecting a broker and determining the commission
rate to be paid, the investment manager is free to consider all of the
services made available to the manager by the broker. The extent to
which a manager may pay for such services through increased commis-
sion rates will, of course, depend upon all of the facts, such as the
amount of the advisory fee the manager is receiving, whether the fee
may be otherwise increased, whether the research being acquired is
364. Section 28(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (Supp. V, 1975) (emphasis supplied).
365. See Senate Report, supra note 271, at 69-71.
366. The House Report accompanying H.R. 4111, which was the House version
of the Act, states "[ilt is, of course, expected that money managers paying brokers an
amount which is based upon the quality and reliability of the broker's services, in.
cluding the availability and value of research, would stand ready and be required to
demonstrate that such expenditures were bona fide." House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 123, 94th Cong., Ist Scss. 95 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as House Report].
367. Senate Report, supra note 271, at 71.
368. Section 28(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (Supp. V, 1975).
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available for hard dollars, the manager's perception of the quality of the
research, the reliability and financial responsibility of the broker, the
quality of the broker's back office services, and whether the broker can
obtain a more favorable or prompt execution. In summary, the man-
ager must make a decision on the basis of an analysis of the result which
the manager reasonably believes will flow from the selection of the
broker-will the client be benefitted? In essence, the propriety of paying
up will be determined on the basis of general fiduciary principles.310 9
It should be noted that the Act does not preempt contractual
provisions limiting the ability of a fiduciary to "pay-up." Thus, provi-
sions in advisory contracts and trust agreements relating to the execu-
tion of brokerage transactions or payment of brokerage commissions are
controlling.
To avoid the possibility that it would be construed to permit give-
ups and reciprocal practices, the Act provides clearly that only a
fiduciary may cause a broker to be paid a higher commission for that
broker's execution of a transaction if such fiduciary determines that the
services received from that broker justify the payment. 3' 0
The SEC has revised its disclosure guidelines in response to new
section 28(e). The staff is no longer requiring investment companies to
distinguish between services bought with brokerage and those supplied
369. See Release No. 9,598 (May 9, 1972).
The Act by its terms does not specifically exclude tile patncnt of increased
commissions to anl adviser-broker. Moreover, S. 470. 93d Cong., Ist St-as. (1973), one of
the forerunner bills to the Act, specifically excluded a transaction with all adsiscr-
broker from the provision permitting an adviser to pay-up. Hoveicr. the Act also
differs from S. 470 in that the Act is not limited to paying up ft)r research-it cosers
*brokerage and research services"-whereas S. 470 only covered research senios. More-
over, it is also important to recognize that effectihe May 1. 1978, adsiwrs are pro-
hibited from executing portfolio transactions for their clients' accounts. See text
accompanying note 374, infra. Thus, insofar as broker-affiliates are concerned, it
would seem that the Act should not be read to permit an ad iser-broker to recciie
additional compensation specifically for research through brokerage commissions. This
view is consistent with the position previously taken by the SEC. See Release No.
9,598 (May 9, 1972).
On the other hand, the SEC has made clear that a broker-adviser may receive
more than the lowest available commission rate, provided that such rate is at least as
favorable to the client as the client would be able to obtain from another qualified
firm and provided that the affiliate's rate has not been increased by a research ele.
ment. Release No. 9,598 (May 9, 1972). In short, the affiliated broker mtist "stand
ready to demonstrate that such expenditures were bona fide." Statement of tie
Securities and Exchange Commission on the Future Structure of the Securities
Markets, at 34 (February 2, 1972).
A developing question under section 28(e) is whether it applies to principal as
well as agency transactions, since it speaks only of "connissions," and whether a
fiduciary may "pay-up" for research not produced in-house. See PLI Securities Law
Institute-III, in 9 Rev. Sec. Reg. 983-84 (1976).
370. See Conference Report, supra note 271, at 108.
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by the adviser or to state whether the availability of such purchased
services is essential to the adviser functioning under his contract. Dis-
closure of the allocation of costs among clients is also not required. The
staff requires only a description of the brokerage practices of the fund8a7
and has indicated that it proposes to issue disclosure guidelines in this
area in the near future.
3 72
While the 1934 Act now provides for open membership,37 3 it man-
dates the separation of money management and brokerage. After May
1, 1978, exchange members will not be able to receive brokerage corn.
missions from managed or affiliated accounts. 374 All managed accounts
-whether fully discretionary, discretionary, discretionary subject to rati-
fication, or merely influenced-other than accounts of natural persons-
are subject to the prohibition. 375 The exceptions to the affiliated account
prohibition are market maker, stabilizing, arbitrage, odd-lot, and error
transactions. The Act instructs the SEC to prevent institutions which
were not members on May 1, 1975 from becoming members for the
purpose of doing brokerage for managed or affiliated accounts during
the period before the prohibition becomes effective. Although the SEC
has the statutory authority, the Conference Report specifically enjoins
the SEC from broadening the exceptions. 370
The Conference Report also requests the Department of Labor and
the Internal Revenue Service to conform the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA)377 to the May 1, 1978 date for the phase-out
of the combination of management and brokerage,3 78 and exemptions
have been adopted under the ERISA provisions so that agency transac-
tions effected on behalf of a.benefit plan by a broker who also acts as
investment adviser are exempt from the prohibited transaction section
of ERISA until May 1, 1978 if the broker ordinarily and customarily
effected such transactions on May 1, 1975.379
The SEC is given authority to further regulate affiliated transactions
both on exchanges and in the over-the-counter market3 8 0 It is authorized
to regulate exchange transactions by odd-lot dealers and specialists and
371. See Securities Week, Aug. 4, 1975; Oct. 13, 1975; Oct. 20, 1975.
372. See PLI Securities Law Institute-III, in 9 Rev. Sec. Reg. 983, 984 (1970);
341 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. A-9 (1976).
373. See text accompanying note 351 supra.
374. Sections 11(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k(a), (b) (Supp. V, 1975).
375. Release No. 12055 (Jan. 27, 1976).
376. Conference Report, supra note 271, at 106.
377. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1001 and scattered
sections of 5, 18, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
378. Conference Report, supra note 271, at 107.
379. 40 Fed. Reg. 50845 (1975).
380. Sections 11(a)(2), 11(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k(a)(2)(b) (Supp. V, 1975). Sec text
accompanying notes 295-96 supra.
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has authority to limit specialist activities to broker or dealer and to
prohibit a dealer from acting as a broker in the same security. 38
The 1934 Act has been amended to require every person, other than
a natural person, who invests for his own account, and any person who
exercises investment discretion, to file such disclosure reports with the
SEC as the SEC may require with respect to portfolios of $100 million.3 r2
The reports, which disclose the composition of the portfolio, must be
filed at least annually and may be required to be filed quarterly.
The effect of the decision of Rosenfeld v. Black38s on the sale of
investment advisers was a concern of major implications. The Act adds
section 15(f) to the Investment Company Act which permits the sale
of an investment adviser at a profit if certain conditions are satisfied.38
An investment adviser may now be sold for more than book value if for
three years after the sale seventy-five percent of the directors of the in-
vestment company are disinterested and as a result of the sale there is
not imposed any "unfair burden" on the investment company. An "un-
fair burden" includes any arrangement during the two-year period after
the transaction whereby the adviser is entitled to receive any compensa-
tion directly or indirectly (i) from any person in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities or other property to, from, or on behalf of
such company, other than bona fide ordinary compensation as principal
underwriter for such company, or (ii) from such company or its security
holders for other than bona fide investment advisory or other services.3 11
The seventy-five percent and unfair burden tests are not applicable to
a public offering by an adviser which does not result in change in
control.38
6
Miscellaneous Provisions.-SEC Injunctions-The SEC continues to
have authority to seek an injunction when it believes a person is engaged
or is about to engage in a violation of the federal securities laws. "8 T
Further, the 1934 Act now prohibits the consolidation or coordination
of an SEC enforcement action with other private actions without the
consent of the SEC.388
Transaction Fees-The transaction fee payable by exchanges has
been increased from 1/500 percent to 1/300 percent of the aggregate
dollar sales of listed securities other than debt securities. A similar
381. Sections 11(b), 15(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k(b), 78o(c)(5) (Supp. V. 1975).
382. Section 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (Supp. V, 1975) ($10 million if the SEC so
determines).
383. See text accompanying note 283 supra.
384. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f) (Supp. V, 1975).
385. Section 15(f)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f)(2)(B) (Supp. V. 1975).
386. Section 15(f)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f)(4) (Supp. V, 1975).
387. Section 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. V, 1975).
388. Section 21(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (Supp. V. 1975).
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broker-dealer fee on over-the-counter transactions has been added to
the 1934 Act.389
Secondary Mortgage Transactions-The Act also adds section 4(5)
to the Securities Act of 1933, providing a limited transactional exemp.
tion from its registration requirements for sales (including participations)
of promissory notes secured by a first lien on a single parcel of real
estate on which is located a dwelling or other residential or commercial
structure.3
9 0
Congressional Oversight-Congress has taken steps to assure that the
SEC will follow through with its obligations under the Act. First, section
23 of the 1934 Act has been amended to require the SEC to include in
its annual report: a summary of the SEC's oversight activities with
respect to self-regulatory organizations for which it is not the appro-
priate regulatory agency; information, data, and recommendations on
the development of a national clearance and settlement system and the
establishment of a national market system; a statement of steps it has
taken toward ending the physical movement of securities and its recom-
mendations for legislation to eliminate certificates; a summary of its
regulatory activities with respect to municipal securities dealers for which
it is not the appropriate regulatory agency; a description of the effect of
the absence of fixed rates; and information on the effect its rules have
on small brokers and dealers, and its efforts to assure the continued
participation by them in the securities markets.80 ' Second, section 35
of the 1934 Act has been amended to provide for the SEC's budgets for
fiscal 1976 and 1977. 302 Thus, the SEC will have to apply to Congress
for additional funds, giving Congress another opportunity to review
progress under the Act.
389. Section 31, 15 U.S.C. § 78ce (Supp. V, 1975).
390. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(5) (Supp. V, 1975).
391. 15 U.S.C. § 78w (Supp. V, 1975). In this connection, the SEC has adopted a
uniform FOCUS report which replaces the several reports which previously had to
be filed with the various agencies, thus coordinating the reporting process, and hiaq
amended various rules to accommodate the new FOCUS requirement. Release No.
11,935 (Nov. 19, 1975). In addition, a new form U-4 has been adopted for use in
registering individuals with the SEC and state regulatory agencies. See Release No.
11,530 (July 10, 1975).
392. 15 U.S.C. § 78kk (Supp. V, 1975).
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